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ABSTRACT 
 
BROCKWEHL, ALEXANDER  Toward Democratic “No-Rule”: A Conceptual 
Response to Contemporary Challenges to Political Freedom.  Department of Political 
Science, March 2011 
 
ADVISOR: Lori Marso 
 
 In this thesis, I argue that different conceptions of freedom yield different 
manifestations of governance.  I demonstrate that in the United States, a private 
conception of freedom grounded in individual and state sovereignty has been repeated in 
political discourse with severe consequences for democracy. This conception of freedom 
derives largely from America’s founding, from a reliance on legal language, and from 
fundamental assumptions about the role of the people in governance. It institutionalizes 
social and political hierarchies through promoting and protecting individual autonomy.  
 In contrast to this dominant form of freedom, I sketch an alternative that 
encourages public engagement, political responsiveness, and citizen responsibility.  My 
theory of freedom, based largely on the writings of Hannah Arendt, incorporates 
freedom’s complexity, interconnectivity, and instability. The conception of freedom that I 
put forth approximates the Arendtian condition of “no-rule,” enabling a form of non-
hierarchical political organization in which the people actually debate and decide. 
 I develop this theoretical framework by applying it to contemporary case studies 
in American politics. Through scrutinizing the methods of judgment employed in the 
Sonia Sotomayor confirmation hearings, highlighting the limits of legal language in 
addressing protests at military funerals, and exposing the Tea Party’s reassertion of 
political and social hierarchies through its antihistorical and ethnocentric appropriation of 
freedom, I will present a new way of conceptualizing and responding to political events. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 Freedom and democracy are terms so overused in American political discourse 
that one might be inclined to conceive of them as political support mechanisms rather 
than ideals. Politicians justify everyday decisions on loosely democratic grounds and 
perceived battles over citizen freedoms remain among the most contentious of all. Many 
theorists have argued that the ambiguity of democracy and freedom leaves these terms 
vulnerable to exploitation and ultimately devoid of substance or meaning. In “We are all 
democrats now,” Wendy Brown contends that democracy is an “unfinished principle,”1 
whose lack of specificity renders it susceptible to appropriation by various peoples and 
governments. 
 Yet I believe that categorically disregarding the principles of freedom and 
democracy as excessively vague serves to justify a withdrawal from the all-important 
ideological battle over the substance of freedom and its relationship to democratic ideals. 
I argue that there exists a deeply ingrained, institutionalized, and coherent conception of 
freedom in the United States that is repeated and rearticulated in the mainstream but that 
is importantly incompatible with the ideal of democracy. This conception is grounded in 
privacy, individualism, and sovereignty. It is rooted in the state’s promotion and 
protection of individual autonomy, which serves to institutionalize social and political 
hierarchies. This conception of freedom derives largely from America’s founding, from 
expectations as to how past events should inform contemporary political decision-
making, from the language of statehood and legality, and from invocations of a coherent 
national identity. It is supported by a set of fundamental assumptions about the role of the 
people in governance, the relationship between the citizen and the state, and the kinds of 
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sacrifices that must be made in the interest of stability. In the chapters that follow I will 
show that this conception of freedom has been reinforced in political discourse for 
centuries with societal consequences that have long been overlooked. I will also seek to 
explain why its repetition ultimately leads away from democratic ideals and toward a 
political dead end. 
 In rejecting this conception, I will put forth an alternative way of thinking about 
freedom that strives toward the ideal of citizen self-governance through enabling public 
engagement, political responsiveness, and citizen responsibility. My conception of 
freedom is fluid, complex, and unstable, though not destabilizing. It derives from a belief 
that political rights and liberties, as defended by legal institutions, are insufficient for 
ensuring conditions of substantive freedom. My conception of freedom defies notions of 
individual, collective, or state sovereignty, instead acknowledging and celebrating the 
interconnected reality of political life and revealing the futility of individual, societal, and 
legal attempts to escape from this condition. In clarifying the conception of freedom that 
I am putting forth, I will distinguish the unpredictable realities of freedom from the 
common assumption that freedom is destabilizing and must be checked, instead asserting 
the possibility and need for freedom and certain forms of governance to function in a 
mutually reinforcing way. 
 In writing this thesis I aim to express my concerns about the state of our 
democracy. I believe that America’s failure to even approximate democratic ideals can be 
partially attributed to how its citizens conceive of freedom. Furthermore, I contend that 
different conceptions of freedom can have tangible implications for shaping and molding 
a government in a way that aligns with or contradicts democratic ideals. In the U.S. the 
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repetition of past mistakes and the unquestioning acceptance of entrenched ways of 
thinking suggest a need for a thorough elucidation of the many elements that inform 
traditional notions of freedom as well as an offering of a substantive alternative. In 
writing about freedom I hope to achieve both of these aims, exposing the ways in which 
certain appropriations of freedom subjugate the individuals they claim to set free while 
arguing that a different conception of freedom is attainable.  
 In developing both my criticism of contemporary conceptions of freedom and the 
alternative that I intend to offer, I will consult a number of classical and contemporary 
theorists. Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir will guide much of my discussion. 
Arendt’s analysis will help to reveal the complex relationship between freedom and 
governance while Beauvoir’s discussion will strengthen my claim that freedom is a 
collective condition and one whose existence depends upon a certain form of 
responsibility.  
 I will also consult contemporary theorists in each chapter. Jason Frank’s insights 
on the role of the citizen in governance, Jill Lepore’s discussion of insincere political 
appropriations of past events, Judith Butler’s allocation of responsibility for injurious 
speech acts, Paul Passavant’s illumination of the paradox of rights, and Patchen Markell’s 
interrogation of rule all guide my discussion in the chapters that follow. Each of their 
arguments addresses a particular contributing factor to the definition of freedom that I 
have outlined. Moreover, my discussion of their writings will help to frame the latter half 
of each chapter, which will focus on one or more case studies that I have chosen in 
contemporary U.S. politics. These case studies make manifest the implications of currents 
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ways of thinking about freedom, presenting modern challenges to democracy and 
revealing the tendency to respond to new problems in repetitive ways.  
 Chapter One will consider the importance of founding moments to examine how 
conceptions of freedom stem from formative past events. Specifically, the chapter begins 
by analyzing The Federalist Papers and elucidating the failure of the framers to 
incorporate the American Revolution’s concept of freedom into the nation’s most 
important founding document. By putting James Madison’s argument in Federalist 51 in 
conversation with Hannah Arendt and Jason Frank, the Constitution is exposed as a 
means of defining the limits of political space for citizens and as a method of persuading 
citizens that their freedom is contingent upon representative protection. By proclaiming a 
devotion to stability (and the power that it implied for them as educated white males) 
above all else, Madison and his partners were able to exclude the aims and principles of 
the American Revolution from the Constitution, developing a foundation that inhibited 
freedom under the guise of ensuring it.  
 After recognizing how the framers’ focus on stability served to undermine the 
possibility of substantive freedom for citizens, the discussion moves into an assessment 
of contemporary interpretations of the founding. On a basic level, the common political 
practice of revering the Constitution constitutes a denial of freedom because it 
compounds the original failures of the framers to capture and enhance substantive 
freedom. But I contend that current interpretations of the founding have done far worse 
than just magnify these failures. With Jill Lepore’s idea of “historical fundamentalism”2 
in mind, I argue that certain policymakers, activists, and judges have forwarded a 
reactionary agenda of Constitution worship through an insincere tribute to a 
 5 
manufactured and distorted past. By assuming that America was once a homogeneous 
country and that the Constitution was the product of consensus and not widespread 
disagreement (as well as marginalization through reliance on established social 
hierarchies), today’s Constitution worshippers aim to deny heterogeneity and discord 
from discussions about the role of the Constitution in shaping twenty-first century 
America. This practice is evident in Supreme Court confirmation hearings, in which 
prospective justices are examined based upon their loyalty to the “original intent” of the 
founders and the likelihood that they will arrive upon the very decisions that the founders 
would have made. In focusing on the confirmation hearings of Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, 
I will express how these hearings became a struggle over interpretations of the founding 
and over the ways in which past events should and do shape current approaches to 
judging and decision-making more broadly. Sotomayor’s sex and race, as well as 
comments she made in a number of speeches throughout her career, led her to be 
ostracized by conservative Senators as a threat to American values and a latent “judicial 
activist.”3 Above all, however, her honesty regarding the significance of personal 
experiences in informing the process of judging challenged an increasingly accepted 
belief, and one which has its origins in the federalist writings, that judgment should 
consist merely of the application of rules. 
 The second chapter considers how we theorize our relationship to one another and 
its consequences for freedom. Targeting Locke and Mill, I will interrogate private, 
individualist conceptions of freedom that serve as an escape from political engagement 
and from its associated responsibilities. I will also call into question Rousseau’s notion of 
the “general will,” employing Arendt’s critique of sovereignty to refute his vision for 
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cohesive political engagement. With Beauvoir’s “situated freedom” as a basis, I will put 
forth a conception of “public” freedom, positing that language is essential to facilitating 
appeals to the freedoms of others. I will also present the claim that freedom and 
responsibility are inextricably linked, and that substantive freedom can only be 
experienced through engagement with the world and with others.  
 Building upon the theories of Beauvoir and Arendt, I will dissect freedom of 
speech in the U.S., focusing on instances of violent speech and the legal defenses that are 
presented in these cases. In this section I argue that Locke and Mill’s individualist 
framework has enabled freedom of speech to become grounds for justification of violent 
speech and for exemption from accepting responsibility for the consequences of such 
speech. In the news media and elsewhere, talking heads incite violence against their 
fellow citizens while hiding behind a value that, in its First Amendment manifestation, 
implies a separation of individual freedoms. In discussing Glenn Beck’s targeting of two 
civil rights organizations and protests at military funerals by members of a Topeka 
Church, I will not propose a legal remedy to these forms of violent speech; however, I 
will also not concede that freedom of speech laws are too sacred to ever be condemned, 
even for their unintended consequences. I will instead assert the inadequacy of legal 
language in articulating the injury that is suffered in these cases, contending that the First 
Amendment is one example of the law’s inability to reflect the complexities of freedom 
and responsibility. By emphasizing the limit of the law in these cases, I will criticize the 
inclination to abandon all attempts at establishing responsibility once freedom of speech 
rights have been invoked, instead fortifying my argument that the law is incapable of 
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expressing substantive freedom in such a way as to effectively mediate between 
competing rights claims.  
 The third chapter will seek to combine my discussion of our problematic 
orientation to the past in Chapter One with our failure to recognize the interconnectivity 
of our freedoms in looking at globalization’s seemingly counterintuitive and highly 
antidemocratic enhancement of racial intolerance. I argue that the founders’ reduction of 
political rights into a set of liberties, as well as their establishment of laws to mediate 
between these rights, enabled much of the ethnocentrism that pervades the contemporary 
United States. I will consult Paul Passavant in arguing that rights provide grounds for 
inclusion but also grounds for exclusion. I will also reference the works of Wendy 
Brown, Bonnie Honig, and Arjun Appadurai in considering how globalization challenges 
absolute state sovereignty, which is a core idea behind the modern nation-state.  
 In the second half of the chapter I turn to political and social policies that seek to 
reclaim sovereignty and reassert a form of national identity within the realms of religion 
and global capital. I consider first the issue of immigration, discussing the wall 
constructed along the U.S.-Mexico border and Arizona’s recent law, Senate Bill 1070, 
which obligates law enforcement officials to determine the immigration status of anyone 
who may be “reasonably suspected” of being in the country illegally. With help from 
Arjun Appadurai, I argue that America’s dependence on Mexican workers has exposed 
absolute state sovereignty as an illusion. Arizona’s law is merely one manifestation of a 
state-led attempt to reassert state sovereignty and to cling to some imagined form of 
national identity. Next I discuss a lawsuit filed by a number of Murfreesboro, Tennessee 
residents to block an expansion project to build a Muslim community center and mosque. 
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As with Arizona’s response to immigration, these citizens looked to the law in order to 
propagate an agenda of ethnocentrism and exclusion. However, while the Arizona law 
potentially calls into question the citizenship of everyone who appears “foreign,” the 
Murfreesboro lawsuit—which claims that the rights of the plaintiffs were impinged by 
allowing Muslim Americans the full rights of citizens—interrogates the quality of 
citizenship that should be afforded Muslim residents. The plaintiffs’ attempt to deny 
rights to Muslim Americans reflects the way in which globalization has produced a hotly 
contested political battleground. Americans have generally responded to the challenge of 
globalization by attempting to validate the supremacist idea behind the modern nation-
state, even at the cost of entirely abandoning democracy’s inherent inclusiveness. 
 In Chapter Four I will clarify my critique of the state, preemptively deflecting 
criticism that my theory of freedom tends toward anarchy by interrogating the traditional 
framework through which freedom and governance are considered to be in opposition to 
one another. I will assert that the common assumption that freedom necessarily defies an 
established order and that governance must limit citizen freedoms in the interest of 
stability is based upon citizens’ acceptance of a fundamentally flawed analytic 
framework. Stability is an appealing prospect; however, the form of stability that 
governments often promise can in no way be ensured, regardless of citizens’ willingness 
to forfeit political freedoms. Through exposing these promises of stability as insincere I 
will untangle the frequently accepted correlation between stability and hierarchical rule, 
which depends upon the assumption that freedom undermines stability. Ultimately, I will 
argue that freedom is incompatible with rule but not with other forms of non-hierarchical 
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governance, and in fact requires governance if free acts are to retain their contextual 
meaning. 
 With the freedom-governance dichotomy in mind, I will analyze the Tea Party 
movement in the U.S. Drawing on Jill Lepore, Jason Frank, and the authors of a number 
of contemporary exposés on the movement, I will argue that the Tea Party’s assault on 
government as a threat to freedom has actually undermined the realization of substantive 
freedom for citizens. The Tea Party’s employment of the traditional antagonism between 
freedom and governance has propped up a corporate-funded campaign that seeks to 
exacerbate existing socioeconomic inequalities through demonizing the federal 
government and its social policies. Under the financial tutelage of entrenched Wall Street 
elites like the Koch brothers, the Tea Party has organized frustrated individuals into a 
misguided mob hell-bent on cutting the size of government; or so its members think. The 
Tea Party’s inherently contradictory political philosophy manifests itself in practice as a 
confused and incoherent right-wing group whose lone source of unity is some make-
believe version of the American Revolution. Through promoting a theory of antihistory, 
as well as conceptions of freedom based upon individualism and ethnocentrism, the Tea 
Party has not only acted against the self-interests of its predominantly middle-class 
members but has actually fortified the conditions of rule that it claims to protest. In this 
sense, I will argue that the Tea Party movement has created a substantial challenge to the 
very value that it purports to hold sacred: freedom. 
 Through my analysis in each chapter I will put forth a conception of freedom that 
defies democracy, as well as one that is not only compatible with democracy but in fact 
requires it. My vision for freedom can fit only with a system of democratic governance in 
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which the people debate and decide. What I seek to present is not only a unique 
examination of political freedom, but also a new way of interpreting and responding to 
political events that calls into question conventional responses. While I will not present 
hopeful projections about the future of democracy, I write with the belief that my 
conception of substantive freedom can enhance democracy and that reconsidering the 
way we think about freedom could have substantive effects. 
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Chapter I. A Twenty-First Century Constitution 
“Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind... as 
new discoveries are made... institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times" 
– Thomas Jefferson 
 
 There may well be no period in American history more commonly referenced in 
the country’s present-day political discourse than that of the American Revolution and 
the subsequent founding of the nation. Although the earliest post-revolutionary leaders of 
the United States were wary of inciting a second revolution, Jill Lepore explains in The 
Whites of their Eyes that “the Revolution was so brilliant and daring – and, of course, so 
original and definitive and constitutive – that everyone wanted to claim to have inherited 
it.”4 Today, more than two hundred years removed from American independence, there 
are still few claims to power endowed with more seeming legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people than those that assert the Revolution and its leaders or the Constitution and its 
framers as the source of their mandate. But with so many groups and individuals claiming 
to be the rightful heirs to the Revolution and the legitimate interpreters of Madison and 
Jefferson, whom should we listen to in determining the role that our nation’s founding 
moments should play in shaping our contemporary politics? In revisiting these moments 
and dissecting the legacy that our founders left us can we better conceptualize America’s 
complex relationship to the past—a relationship that is at once dependent and 
exploitative, reverential and irreverent?  
 In this chapter I will return to these founding moments because I argue that 
divergent interpretations of our founding moments give rise to different conceptions of 
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freedom. Implicit in America’s founding documents are assumptions about the content of 
political freedom and about the extent to which the people should govern in a civil 
society. Similarly, contemporary interpretations of these documents not only reflect 
general assumptions about freedom but also imply a certain role for these founding 
documents in informing today’s political process. In particular, highly deferential 
interpretations of the Constitution tend to suggest that the founders struck an ideal 
balance between freedom and stability, and that the goal of the political process should be 
to preserve and protect those freedoms that the founding documents afford citizens. 
These sorts of interpretations often imply that through a close reading of founding 
documents we can elicit the “true” or “original” intention of the founders and then apply 
their visionary principles to our daily lives.  
 While countless historians, scholars, and Supreme Court Justices have scoured the 
Constitution in hopes of deciphering the “original intent” of the framers, this will not be 
my aim. I will instead revisit important founding documents with the goal of 
understanding our founders’ vision of freedom and subsequently analyzing the ways in 
which varying interpretations of our founding moments fail to fully engage the founders’ 
conception. The decisions the founders made, the interests they prioritized, and the 
compromises they reached all influence our political process today and, as I will show, 
continue to inform the way we think about political freedom. If we are to expose a deeply 
ingrained conception of freedom that defies democratic ideals, I argue that we must start 
with America’s founding. 
 Hannah Arendt will be essential to my analysis in this chapter, as she argues that 
the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights provided a foundation that was inconsistent with 
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the goals of the American Revolution. Arendt conceives of freedom as a condition 
experienced by a body politic through civic engagement and widespread inclusion in 
daily political decision-making.5 In her view, “freedom, which only seldom—in times of 
crisis or revolution—becomes the direct aim of political action, is actually the reason that 
men live together in political organization at all.”  Without freedom, she asserts, 
“political life as such would be meaningless.”6 In Arendt’s discussion of America’s 
founding, she argues that the participants in the American Revolution fought for freedom 
but attained only liberation, which “may be the condition of freedom but by no means 
automatically leads to it.”7 The first goal of this chapter will be to understand how 
Arendt’s conception of substantive freedom may have been lost in transition between 
Revolution and governance. Arendt’s critique forces us to ask a crucial question: was the 
U.S. Constitution a failure upon which all subsequent moments in American political 
history are predicated? 
 How did the framers envision freedom in the new nation? Was the quest for 
freedom embodied in America’s founding documents? The task the framers undertook 
was undoubtedly difficult. They attempted to facilitate a transition from revolution, 
which Arendt tells us necessarily aims for freedom, to governance and its inherent 
tendency toward organization and stability. While I will explore more extensively in 
Chapter Four the complexity of the tension between rule and revolution, for now I will 
merely highlight the fact that the founders seemed to view anarchy and rule by elites as 
their lone options. As Madison makes clear in Federalist 10, the founders believed that 
certain sacrifices must be made in the interest of political stability. Specifically, they 
believed that it was the role of government to impose certain restraints on the citizenry in 
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order to guard against democracy’s tendency toward faction. As Madison relates, the 
founders faced something of a governmental dilemma and ultimately decided that 
political freedom, conceived of as widespread civic involvement in political processes, 
could not coincide with stable governance. 
 Among my primary concerns in approaching this chapter is the tendency of 
contemporary interpretations of the founding to ignore the complexities of the dilemma 
that the Constitution’s framers faced. Today we see Supreme Court Justices and their 
right-wing cheerleaders advocating a “textualist” form of constitutional interpretation and 
anti-government activists proclaiming a need to replenish Thomas Jefferson’s “Tree of 
Liberty,” yet rarely does it seem that these individuals even consider the compromises the 
framers made or their likely failures. With glorified images of the Constitutional 
convention, in all of their distorted forms, wielding considerable influence today, it 
becomes particularly important to weigh the implications of accepting interpretations of 
the founding that invoke a certain vision for the past that is unsubstantiated by historical 
fact. As explained in a September 2010 column in The Economist, referring to the 
proliferation of so-called “Constitution worship,” the stakes are high: “When history is 
turned into scripture and men into deities, truth is the victim.”8 
 This chapter will begin by revisiting founding moments to determine to what 
extent the Constitution provides a foundation consistent with the Arendtian notion of 
freedom. Using the federalist debates as a guide, I will consider the questions raised by 
the framers at the time of the nation’s founding as to who should rule, how their power 
should be checked, and where “we the people” would factor in. The intent of this section 
will be to extract from The Federalist Papers a definition of freedom that can then be 
 15 
juxtaposed to the one put forth by Arendt. The goal of this kind of comparative analysis 
will be to understand the extent to which the Constitution’s framers believed citizens 
should be involved in political processes and to assess the authenticity of their attempt to 
reconcile stable governance with freedom. 
 From this basis in the nation’s founding moments, the discussion will move to 
contemporary (mis) representations of the American Revolution and the U.S. 
Constitution. The “battle over the Revolution” that Jill Lepore describes, is becoming 
more fierce with each passing day. Over the last few decades, many politicians, pundits, 
and activists have successfully and insincerely appropriated the aims of the Revolution, 
the language of the Constitution, and the ideals of the framers in order to forward a 
radically regressive, intolerant, and ethnocentric agenda. As might be expected, such 
devotion to a particular, nonexistent past is highly restrictive and, I will argue, is 
incompatible with democratic ideals. The notion that solutions to present problems lie in 
looking backward and not forward, whether subscribed to as a quasi-religious doctrine or 
merely exercised as a political ploy, yields a highly static conception of freedom that 
directly contradicts the one presented by Arendt. What makes these appropriations so 
powerful and dangerous, however, is their antihistorical nature, as they nostalgically 
invoke an image of America’s past that never actually existed.  
 Finally, I will consider how forms of constitutional reverence have penetrated 
jurisprudence by influencing public expectations about the process of judging. Through 
examining the 2009 confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, I 
hope to show how the static conception of freedom that I have revealed produces a set of 
assumptions about the process of judging and the extent to which individuals—and 
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particularly those who are not white males—should be entrusted with the responsibility 
of weighing various factors in making important decisions. During the Senate 
confirmation hearings, a number of conservative senators alleged that Sotomayor was a 
future judicial activist who would disregard the Constitution upon joining the bench. 
Their suggestion that judging should be merely the passive application of rules reflects a 
Madisonian conception of freedom as a condition protected by a powerful few for the 
perceived best interest of everyone else. 
 Ultimately, after scrutinizing the founders’ conception of freedom and 
deconstructing contemporary interpretations of founding moments, I hope to illuminate 
how conceptions of freedom derive from the establishment of a certain relationship with 
the past. While the founders failed to allow for citizen involvement in political processes, 
contemporary appropriations of the founding tend to compound their failure, further 
excluding citizens from decision-making. In this sense, I will not suggest that the 
founders are fully responsible for the proliferation of a conception of freedom that is 
incompatible with democratic ideals. Rather, I intend to merely recognize their influence 
in producing a conception of freedom that has had, and continues to have, profound 
consequences for democracy. 
Part I. Constitutional Failure: The Loss of Revolutionary Freedom 
 “If revolution had aimed only at the guarantee of civil rights, then it would not 
have aimed at freedom but at liberation from governments which had overstepped their 
powers and infringed upon well-established rights,”9 asserts Hannah Arendt in On 
Revolution. As Arendt suggests here, the revolutionaries who took up arms against the 
British desired more than a changing of the guard; they sought “to build a new house 
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where freedom can dwell.”10 As she elaborates, “only where change occurs in the sense 
of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of 
government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from 
oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.”11 
Arendt argues that the revolutionaries wanted freedom insofar as they wanted to take 
political action and develop an entirely new form of government in which the people 
would debate and decide publicly. According to Arendt, they sought “a form of political 
organization in which the citizens lived together under conditions of no-rule, without a 
division between rulers and ruled.” (On revolution 22) If conditions of no-rule were the 
core aim of the Revolution, then we must ask whether or not this form of freedom was 
attained through the establishment of a republic. 
 In The Federalist Papers, written to New Yorkers in support of the Constitution 
during the debate over its ratification, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay—under the pseudonym ‘Publius’—offer their view as to what role the people should 
play in the new government. In The Federalist 10, Madison confronts the enduring 
tension between state stability and citizen autonomy in his discussion of faction. He 
defines faction as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of 
interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.”12 Madison is evidently concerned about the permanence of 
the union, but his notion of faction is based upon the assumption that a free citizenry 
would necessarily destabilize an established order. This assumption, as we will further 
explore, enables the exclusion of the citizenry from the governing process. Furthermore, 
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it raises questions as to how the content of the “aggregate interests of the community” 
might be determined, who might be authorized to accurately defend these interests, and 
whether or not any communal interest could be established as “permanent” and thus 
assume primacy over all other interests.  
 A contemporary interpreter of Madison, Jason Frank (Constituent Moments), 
asserts the importance of potentially destabilizing and even subversive activities in 
reclaiming the power of the people. He terms such activities “constituent moments,” 
broadly defined as instances “when the underauthorized…seize the mantle of 
authorization, changing the inherited rules of authorization in the process.”13 Although 
such activities may at times (though not always) threaten established governmental 
processes, they distinguish themselves from other forms of disobedience in that they 
“enact their claims wholly on the democratic authority of the people themselves: out of 
these enactments a new democratic subject emerges.”14 Far from being anti-democratic, 
constituent moments are the product of unrestricted exercise of the will of the “demos.” 
These free actions transgress societal limitations, but in doing so carve out a new 
democratic political space.  
 While Frank would likely see faction as not only inevitable but in fact necessary 
to the exercise of freedom, Madison devotes much of The Federalist 10 to exploring 
ways to eliminate it. Abolishing liberty would eliminate the causes of faction, but 
Madison is wary of doing so, for he believes the protection of such liberties is “essential 
to political life” and thus “the first object of government.”15 However, it is essential not 
to confuse his concept of liberty with even the most diluted form of freedom. Unlike 
freedom, which, as suggested by Frank, transgressively demands a new political space, 
 19 
liberty operates in an already established space whose limits are outlined by 
representatives of the people’s “permanent interests,” not “the people” themselves.  
 Having conceded that the causes of faction cannot be eliminated, Madison aims to 
alleviate its effects. It is to this end that Madison endorses a republic as a superior form of 
government to a democracy, concluding that “a pure democracy, by which I mean a 
society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.”16 Madison is 
correct in determining that democracy cannot cure disagreement and contentiousness; 
however, his assessment overlooks the fact that the process of democracy does not aim to 
do so. Democracy, or governance by the people, is inherently an exercise in the free 
exchange of ideas that defies regulation and rejects the idea that certain voices should be 
silenced or ignored. It is here that one can see how through portraying differences of 
opinion as dangerous and destabilizing, Madison has altered the terms of the debate from 
concentrating on the collective interest of the union to focusing on protecting the private 
interests of certain citizens.17 Along this vein, he declares, “Hence it is that such 
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been 
found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general 
been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”18 By implying that 
democracy would undermine basic rights, Madison warns citizens of its supposed 
dangers. In portraying democracy as inherently uncontrolled and uncontrollable, he aims 
to convince citizens that it is in their best interest to knowingly and willingly forfeit much 
of their agency to representative structures theoretically capable of harnessing and 
limiting the influence of purportedly destabilizing factions. 
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 Frank takes issue with Madison’s diagnosis of democracy. In addressing 
democratic theorists, Madison writes that those who have “patronized” democracy “have 
erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political 
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their 
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.”19 But Madison’s allegation is entirely 
disingenuous and grossly mischaracterizes democracy’s proponents. As Frank 
emphasizes, the sheer beauty of democracy lies in the inherent diversity of its constituent 
parts and the divergence of opinion that it facilitates. When Frank speaks of the people as 
a “constituent and constituted power” which is “at once a source of public authority and a 
source of resistance to public authority”20 he does not naively expect that citizen interests 
will coincide. Instead, he recognizes those conditions of instability that can and will be 
caused by activities of defiance and insurrection, but embraces them as an essential 
component of the democratic process. At issue for Frank is not whether democracy can 
limit opposing voices, for it is far too obvious that it cannot. At the heart of the question 
of faction is freedom: will citizens be able to engage one another publicly with the intent 
of taking action and having their voices heard or will they instead be limited to enjoying 
those basic liberties that have been selected by their representatives? Under the latter 
conditions, the individual is generally excluded from the daily process of governing.  
 Although the existence of representative structures necessarily implies a lack of 
individual agency, Madison is insistent upon illustrating the merits of representation. 
Much of Madison’s argument in favor of a republic derives from a perception that certain 
individuals are more apt than others at discerning the “common interest” and 
subsequently representing it through enacting laws. Madison speculates, “it may well 
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happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be 
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, 
convened for the purpose.”21 This endorsement of representation is at once naïve and 
oppressive. First, it assumes the existence of a coherent “public good” as voiced through 
representative bodies. Second, it asserts that those individuals endowed with particular 
powers of representation will not only be capable of differentiating between public 
interests and their own interests but will also be willing to choose those interests that may 
contradict their own. Finally, it suggests that individuals shall be elected for displaying 
characteristics such as wisdom and discretion that naturally elevate them above other 
citizens, as opposed to those attributes such as compassion and empathy that would 
instead enable them to fully understand and appreciate citizen interests. In fairness to 
Madison, he does acknowledge that “the effect [of representation] may be inverted”22; 
however, he only pays lip service to such a possibility, contending that the problem of 
poor representation can be largely solved by increasing the size of the governing body.  
 Writing about the American Revolution, Arendt bemoans the loss of freedom in 
the transition between winning the war and establishing a governing body. In her view, 
the Revolution undoubtedly called for far more than its end result. Liberation, “could 
have been fulfilled under monarchical rule,” she asserts. Freedom, on the other hand, 
“necessitated the formation of a new, or rather rediscovered form of government; it 
demanded the constitution of a republic.”23 The American Revolution introduced to those 
involved the “experience of being free” and, consequently, “the experience of man’s 
faculty to begin something new.”24 But the founding of the nation was ultimately 
disappointing, as the founders opted for a form of social contract instead of a government 
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in which the people govern. A far cry from the Greek “polis,” in which freedom 
necessitated a “political space proper” where people would publicly participate in certain 
activities that recognized the need for the presence of others,25 in the new republic 
individuals would be permitted highly limited access to public spaces and would be led to 
believe that their interests were inevitably in conflict with those of others. In this sense, 
the founders failed to fulfill the legacy of the Revolution. 
 While the Constitution provided the framework for a set of liberties to replace 
freedom as the goal of government, the establishment of a Bill of Rights made the 
Constitution’s denial of substantive freedom far more tangible. By establishing these 
inalienable rights, representative bodies were able to solidify their role as a protective 
entity. The implication, cited repeatedly by Madison in The Federalist 10, was that 
outsiders and opponents to those in power sought to challenge the liberties of citizens and 
that only established representative institutions could stand in their way. In a large sense, 
the development of a Bill of Rights was a way of claiming victory for the development of 
“democracy” but had no significance with regard to enabling the pursuit of public 
freedom. Referring to basic rights, Arendt states, “All of these liberties, to which we 
might add our own claims to be free from want and fear, are essentially negative; they are 
the results of liberation but they are by no means the actual content of freedom which…is 
participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm.”26 As Arendt suggests, 
freedom is not attained on an individual level, but is instead the source of a perpetual and 
daily pursuit experienced collectively by a body politic through civic engagement. An 
individual can achieve freedom only through “admission into the public realm.” The 
establishment of a Bill of Rights implied both a static and individualist conception of 
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freedom, suggesting that rights had been wrested from the British, achieved for the 
American people, and now needed to be protected by representative governing bodies. 
Thus, it might be concluded that the Bill of Rights solidified the Constitution’s negation 
of substantive freedom. 
Part II. Contemporary Appropriations of a Nonexistent Past 
 
 Having established in the first part of this chapter the Constitution’s failure to 
allow citizens to actively pursue freedom through civic involvement, we must consider 
the consequences of accepting the Constitution as a definitive foundation of democracy. 
“He took his debt to the founders seriously,”27 writes Jill Lepore, speaking about Austin 
Hess, a Massachusetts tea party leader whom she met in April 2009. As Hess explained 
to her, referring to America’s founders, “we believe that we are carrying on their 
tradition.”28 Hess’ assumption raises the following questions: what exactly is the tradition 
of the founders, is this tradition worth carrying on, and, if so, who should be given the 
responsibility of doing so? 
 Lepore warns us of the dangers of revering the Constitution and other moments in 
our nation’s founding. Such admiration can induce individuals to subscribe to an 
ideology of “historical fundamentalism,” which she defines as:  
The belief that a particular and quite narrowly defined past—‘the founding’—is 
ageless and sacred and to be worshipped; that certain historical texts—‘the 
founding documents’—are to be read in the same spirit with which religious 
fundamentalists read, for instance, the Ten Commandments; that the Founding 
Fathers were divinely inspired; that the academic study of history (whose 
standards of evidence and methods of analysis are based on skepticism) is a 
conspiracy and, furthermore, blasphemy; and that political arguments grounded in 
appeals to the founding documents, as sacred texts, and to the Founding Fathers, 
as prophets, are therefore incontrovertible.29  
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With the rise of the Tea Party, “historical fundamentalism” is rapidly becoming more and 
more evident as a quasi-religious doctrine that seeks to inform political philosophy. The 
Tea Party’s appropriation of the language of the revolution will be explored in greater 
detail in Chapter Four; however, this chapter will put forth the claim that the proliferation 
of “historical fundamentalism” is by no means a new development brought on 
exclusively by the Tea Party. For decades, politicians, activists, and particularly judges 
have employed the essence of the Constitution as a means of justifying a particular 
decision, stance, or judgment. To what extent these claims of constitutionalism are 
actually legitimate, as well as whether or not such claims should be endowed with greater 
authority than those deriving from the context of the claim, are among the questions that 
this discussion will seek to answer.  
The Constitution and the Court 
 While the spirit of the Constitution pervades American daily life in countless 
ways, there is no arena within which the document demands greater consideration than 
that of jurisprudence. As stipulated in the Constitution’s Article III, “The judicial Power 
of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”30 In practice, this has long 
meant that federal courts are given the awesome responsibility of interpreting the 
Constitution and applying it to contemporary case law. But the term “interpret” is 
extremely vague. For some, interpreting means recovering the general values and ideas 
presented in the Constitution, while for others it entails attempting to decipher in 
seemingly rigorous detail the “original intent” of the nation’s founders.  
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 A thorough examination of the various methods of interpretation is well beyond 
the scope of this discussion. Thus, in this section I will focus solely on an increasingly 
widespread public expectation that justices will not only thoroughly consult the 
Constitution before making judgments but also that they will arrive upon the decision that 
the nation’s founders would have made. I will argue that the latter criterion, used first for 
assessing potential justices and subsequently for evaluating their judgments, compounds 
the framers’ failure to address freedom in any substantive way, both by unquestioningly 
accepting the framers’ reduction of freedom to a set of prescribed liberties and by 
converting a necessarily free process (judgment) into one in which participants are 
obligated to uphold certain preselected principles to the preclusion of others. This 
criterion also serves to undermine the legitimacy of the Constitution itself. When 
judgments are confined to an antiquated document, based upon the undeniably false 
assumption that it will provide sufficient answers to the questions raised by the 
challenges of today, that document becomes exposed to distortion, manipulation, and, 
most importantly, coercion into new spaces of political decision-making within which it 
can claim no actual authorization. Under a guise of protecting the purported values of the 
Constitution, the judiciary has invaded and occupied these public spaces, jointly shared 
by citizens and their representatives, vastly increasing its comparative power and 
undermining freedom and democratic processes.  
 In Wendy Brown’s short essay, “We are All Democrats Now,” she writes about 
the ever-expanding role of the court:  
At the same time, courts themselves have shifted from deciding what is prohibited 
to saying what must be done–in short, from a limiting function to a legislative one 
that effectively usurps the classic task of democratic politics. If living by the rule 
of law is an important pillar of most genres of democracy, governance by courts 
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constitutes democracy’s subversion. Such governance inverts the crucial 
subordination of adjudication to legislation on which popular sovereignty 
depends, and overtly empowers and politicizes a non-representative institution.31  
 
In Brown’s view, the judiciary’s increasingly invasive role is one of many “late modern 
powers and processes [that] have eviscerated the substance of even democracy’s limited 
modern form,”32 and in doing so have served to undermine the essential concept of 
democracy: governance by the people. I contend that this invasion has been legitimized 
through a large-scale judicial appropriation of the Constitution, whereby the Constitution 
has been relegated to a means of defending particular judgments that not only extend well 
beyond the language of the Constitution, but in fact may constitute the very negation of 
the document itself. 
 During the debates over ratification, the anti-Federalists foresaw the potential 
dangers of an overly powerful judicial branch. In Brutus XI, Brutus expresses concern as 
to the lack of checks on the judicial branch, predicting that it would use its control for the 
purpose of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the people. Writing of the Supreme 
Court, he cautions: 
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from time to time 
come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or 
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and 
spirit of the constitution. The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will 
have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can 
correct their errors, or controul their adjudications33 
 
Though Brutus could be applauded for his clairvoyance, the contemporary Court has 
usurped its power in a far more dangerous way than even he imagined. To use Brutus’ 
language, the Court has, in fact, claimed to be confined by fixed or established rules, 
namely those stipulated in the Constitution. Beginning with the Rehnquist court, and later 
with the Reagan and Bush appointees, the Court has developed a standard of judgment 
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that purportedly demands rigid adherence to the text of the Constitution. But in doing so, 
it has developed a constitutional dichotomy whereby individuals are deemed to either 
protect the Constitution or seek to defile it, and to judge in its favor or judge in the 
interest of its long-term detriment. The problem with such a concept—besides its stark 
insincerity and the simple fact that even the most seemingly reverent justice is highly 
capable of exhibiting “activist” tendencies—is that it converts certain judgments into 
unquestionable ones and appropriates the framers for the purposes of defense. As a 
consequence, the very “spirit” of the Constitution begins to adopt a protective, fearful, 
and intolerant complexion that leads us to believe that change and inconsistency 
necessarily imply loss. Suddenly, we find ourselves believing that the Constitution needs 
protectors and viewing those who speak the loudest in its name as worthy of its defense. 
 The development of this binary lens through which to view constitutional 
interpretation is partly to blame for the increasing polarization of the Court along party 
lines. Judicial appointees increasingly embody a set of values and beliefs that coincides 
with those of the president and his political party. But also at work is a greater tension 
within the Court, between progress and preservation, between the hope for change and 
the inevitability of loss. The judiciary is increasingly the site of a tug-of-war over the 
future of America. And so the task of interpreting the Constitution—the defining symbol 
of a grandiose past with its social hierarchies, national images, and “moral” values—has 
involved forming an unalterable and inescapable relationship with the past that either 
scrutinizes and interrogates it or admires and reveres it. As Lepore writes, “The past 
haunts us all. Just how is a subject of this book. But time moves forward, not backward. 
Chronology is like gravity. Nothing falls up.”34  
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 During the recent hearings of Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor, the fear 
of loss that struggles over the Constitution evoke was on full display. The questioning of 
Sotomayor took on a particularly confrontational tone, as a predominantly white and 
predominantly male Senate Judiciary Committee interrogated a Puerto Rican woman who 
had managed to leave the housing projects in the Bronx to attend Princeton University 
and Yale Law School. Despite a nearly immaculate record, Sotomayor had uttered two 
words that would provide ammunition to her detractors: “wise Latina.”  
 In a broader sense, Sotomayor was accused of “empathetic justice” and exhibiting 
activist tendencies. In a 2001 speech at the University of California, Berkeley titled “A 
Latina Judge’s Voice,” Sotomayor offered candid insight into the influence of personal 
experiences on the process of judgment: “personal experiences affect the facts that judges 
choose to see. My hope is that I will take the good from my experiences and extrapolate 
them further into areas with which I am unfamiliar. I simply do not know exactly what 
that difference will be in my judging. But I accept there will be some based on my gender 
and my Latina heritage.”35 Sotomayor’s honesty ultimately came back to haunt her in the 
Senate hearings, as she was repeatedly asked, often indirectly, about the extent to which 
her identity as a Latina woman might influence her decision-making. For his part, 
President Obama may have made matters worse by asserting, honestly, that life 
experiences are important in considering a prospective justice, for “it is experience that 
can give a person a common touch and a sense of compassion; an understanding of how 
the world works and how ordinary people live.”36 In their respective reflections upon the 
proper role of experiences in shaping judgment, both Obama and Sotomayor 
acknowledged the inevitability of experience in informing judgment. In both cases, 
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instead of focusing on whether experiences influence judgments, they chose to focus on 
how exactly those experiences might affect judgments and what types of experiences 
might mold an individual into a good judge.  
 In contrast to the viewpoints expressed by Obama and Sotomayor before the 
hearings, during the hearings the very notion that one would consider any criteria other 
than the Constitution in judging was anathema. Heather K. Gerken, a Yale Law Professor 
and New York Times contributor, grumbled, “confirmation hearings will inevitably drain 
the life out of the law itself.” As she elaborated, “the inexorable logic of politics has led 
both senators and nominees to depict judging as an either/or choice: either the law 
involves the technocratic application of rules to fact, or it involves free-form democratic 
engineering. But there is a vast space between those two positions, and somewhere in that 
space lies the reality of judging.”37 This either/or choice described by Gerken often 
hinges on the role that individuals envision for the Constitution within the sphere of 
judgment.  
 Sotomayor, despite the more genuine sentiments she had expressed in her speech 
at Berkeley, was careful not to suggest that she would take into account any factors other 
than the Constitution in making judgments. Nonetheless, in voting against her 
confirmation, a number of Republican senators stated that they were not fooled. “I was 
not convinced that Judge Sotomayor understands the rights given to Americans under the 
Constitution, or that she will refrain from expanding or restricting those rights based on 
her personal preferences,” exclaimed Senator Charles Grassley, before voting against 
Sotomayor. Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions expressed similar concerns, questioning 
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whether Sotomayor possessed “the deep-rooted convictions necessary to resist the siren 
call of judicial activism,” and ultimately determining that she did not.  
 The Sotomayor hearings illuminate divergent assumptions about the process of 
judgment. A number of conservative senators, in admonishing Sotomayor for her 
supposed tendency toward judicial activism, implied that judging should be merely the 
application of rules. Their assumption that judgments are best when judicial latitude is 
limited reflects Madisonian concerns about instability, as well as an acceptance of his 
solution that independent decision-making must be controlled. Interestingly, there is no 
evidence to suggest that conservative justices are less apt than liberal justices to make 
decisions that break from precedent. I would argue that all justices are susceptible to 
many forms of influences in their decision-making, regardless of their political 
orientation. Nonetheless, it often seems that these hearings are intended merely to 
influence perception. With this in mind, the hearings tend to send a message to the 
general public that it is conservatives, not liberals, who are concerned with protecting the 
sanctity of the Constitution. 
 The hearings of Sonia Sotomayor also exposed the hypocrisy and sheer absurdity 
of judicial blindness and strict constitutionalism. Everyone watching and participating 
was obviously aware of the historic newness of the hearings. Sotomayor was the first 
Latina and only the third woman ever to be nominated to the nation’s highest court. As 
Jill Abramson explains, for Americans who had watched Anita Hill testify during the 
Clarence Thomas hearings, the parallels were eerily similar.38 Nevertheless, the 
contemporary nomination hearing requires that participants play the part, reinforcing the 
notion that justices should (and actually do) only consider the Constitution in making 
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judgments. This, of course, is so obviously not the case to the remotely critical viewer 
that the entire proceeding becomes a mockery of the law and a pathetic display of 
partisan politics. In the Sotomayor hearings Republicans repeatedly attempted to sidestep 
the reality that Sotomayor was a woman and a Puerto Rican, as if to suggest that 
acknowledging that they could see her race and sex would undermine their supposed 
objectivity in judging her.  
 At the core of Republican discontent in the wake of the Sotomayor hearings was 
far more than just the admittance of a potentially left-leaning justice to the Court. 
Sotomayor was someone who could never have been considered for a Supreme Court 
post at an earlier point in American history, and thus embodied a new reality for the 
country and a new direction. During the hearing, she politely defended the Constitution 
and its prescribed liberties, but everybody knew that she had witnessed too much, learned 
too much, and judged far too much to confine herself to a document written when women 
could not vote and slavery was legal. As she diagnosed in her speech at Berkeley,  
America has a deeply confused image of itself that is in perpetual tension. We are 
a nation that takes pride in our ethnic diversity, recognizing its importance in 
shaping our society and in adding richness to its existence. Yet, we 
simultaneously insist that we can and must function and live in a race and color-
blind way that ignores these very differences that in other contexts we laud.39 
 
In this speech Sotomayor illuminates the conflict at the heart of American politics over 
the willingness of Americans to recognize the pluralist reality of today. Those who 
advocate race-blindness tend to suggest that somehow through ignoring differences, those 
differences will disappear. Yet failing to see difference is highly dangerous. As I have 
explained in this chapter, a denial of heterogeneity develops from fervent loyalty to a 
particular notion of a nonexistent homogeneous past. In the courtroom, the Constitution 
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becomes the partition and the Court the battleground between those who yearn for a 
homogeneous past that never existed and those who embrace the country’s heterogeneous 
present and future. It is because subscribing to a “color-blind” ideology entails denying 
this internal conflict and ignoring the complexity of is origins that such an ideology is so 
delusional. 
∗  ∗  ∗  
 As I have aimed to relate in this chapter, the founders’ conception of freedom 
continues to inform how we think about freedom today. Their decisions regarding the 
role of citizens in governing are still valued and respected. These decisions also resulted 
in the establishment of a legal apparatus that acts to reinforce their judgments. In the 
chapters that follow I will build upon the argument that I have made in this chapter and 
the distinction that I have drawn between substantive or public freedom and the 
individualist form of liberty that the founders conferred upon citizens. In doing so, I will 
note the residual effects of our founding moments, as our interpretations of these 
moments continue to shape our conceptions of freedom. The framework I have developed 
in this chapter should enable us to eventually move beyond this Madisonian conception 
of freedom to envision a far more substantive role for the citizenry in political decision-
making. 
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Chapter II. The Responsibilities of Freedom   
“The raison d’etre of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action. This 
freedom which we take for granted in all political theory and which even those who 
praise tyranny must still take into account is the very opposite of ‘inner freedom’ …The 
experiences of inner freedom are derivative in that they always presuppose a retreat from 
the world, where freedom was denied, into an inwardness to which no other has access. 
The inward space where the self is sheltered against the world must not be mistaken for 
the heart or the mind, both of which exist and function only in interrelationship with the 
world”40  
-Hannah Arendt 
 
 As the first chapter explored, the founding of the United States produced a 
conception of freedom that continues to shape political processes to this day. Through the 
process of drafting the Constitution and the subsequent Bill of Rights our founders 
reduced our political freedoms to a set of individual liberties that would then require 
protection from representative governing bodies. Moreover, they justified the exclusion 
of citizens from daily political life on the grounds that disagreement and debate would 
destabilize the young nation. Their neglect of substantive freedom had a profound effect 
upon our way of thinking about freedom, as it led us to conceive of freedom as distinctly 
outside the public realm. In an important sense, freedom became a condition achieved on 
an individual level. Moreover, the founding documents expressed a highly minimalist 
conception of freedom, offering an unwritten social contract by which the state promised 
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to protect certain citizen interests in exchange for those citizens’ forfeiture of the right to 
participate in daily political decision-making. 
 This chapter will explore the theoretical and tangible consequences of considering 
individual freedoms as distinct from one another. It will also analyze the American legal 
framework, arguing that the law mirrors and reinforces this minimalist conception of 
freedom. I will focus largely on responsibility in this chapter, considering the extent to 
which individualist conceptions of freedom may presuppose some form of exemption 
from responsibility for those acts that seem to begin and end with the individual who 
commits them. As I will suggest in this chapter, this concept of individual acts as 
isolated, which derives largely form the “harm principle” introduced by John Stuart Mill, 
is something of an illusion. Almost no political act can be assumed to impact only the 
individual who commits it, as only through escaping politics altogether can one 
conceivably act in a way that does not impact others. As I will argue in this section, a 
retreat from political engagement is by no means an act of freedom. To the contrary, as 
Arendt will help to illuminate, such an escape constitutes freedom’s opposite, as political 
freedom can never be experienced in isolation. 
 Having exposed individualist conceptions of freedom as inconsistent both with 
the content of freedom and the realities of political life, I will offer an alternative 
conception of freedom based upon the notion that individuals are interconnected and 
mutually dependent. Building upon the theories of Arendt and Beauvoir, I will assert that 
freedom cannot be achieved on an entirely individual level, for individuals need others in 
order to pursue freedom through active political life. This condition of mutual 
dependence requires a new articulation of responsibility, which allocates responsibility to 
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individuals for the ways in which their actions influence the conditions within which 
others act. I will further assert in this section that language is essential to facilitating the 
sort of political engagement that freedom requires.  
 With language in mind, I will spend the second half of the chapter discussing the 
First Amendment in the U.S., with a particular focus on instances of violent or hateful 
speech. Judith Butler’s theory of linguistic agency will guide me as I attempt to avoid the 
traditional tendency to seek legal remedy for instances of violent speech. Instead, in 
considering the case of a deranged Glenn Beck listener who attempted to bring Beck’s 
violent threats to fruition, I will articulate a new form of responsibility that recognizes 
language’s constitutive capabilities. In doing so, I will not suggest that this articulation 
provides a solution, but rather that violent speech overwhelms the simplicity of the First 
Amendment.  
 The second case study that I select will further my claim that the law is 
inadequate in encapsulating the trauma and injury of violent speech acts. The Supreme 
Court’s hearings and subsequent decision regarding protests at military funerals should 
make manifest the limits of the law in responding to complex conflicts over fundamental 
rights. While I will not propose that I have a solution to the enduring problem of how to 
punish violent speech, I will instead illuminate how our reliance on this minimalist legal 
language has served to reinforce individualist conceptions of freedom. 
 Through my analysis in this chapter I hope to expose individualist conceptions of 
freedom as simplistic and incompatible with the realities of political life. I also intend to 
assert the need for a more complex conception of freedom, both for reaching a form of 
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political organization that more closely approximates democracy and for establishing 
responsibility in cases where guilt for a particular injury is difficult to establish. 
Part I.  Abandoning Individualism and Sovereignty 
 In order to argue that the concept of freedom that I am putting forth better aligns 
with democratic ideals of citizen self-governance than the individualist notion reflected in 
the Constitution, I will first need to briefly explore the theoretical history of 
“individualist” freedom. The notion of freedom as individual and private was not unique 
at the time of our nation’s founding nor is it today. “Freedom has been a philosophical 
problem of the first order”41 for some time, explains Hannah Arendt. The philosophical 
tradition has long been to equate freedom with the free will and to assume that freedom 
can only be experienced internally and in isolation from others. John Stuart Mill argued 
that “the appropriate region of human liberty” is the “inward domain of consciousness.”42 
Furthermore, in developing the harm principle, which he took in part from John Locke, 
Mill asserts that an individual should be free to act in whatever way he chooses, so long 
as he does not harm others. As Mill proposes, “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.”43 Both the harm principle and the inward experience of freedom 
imply that freedom is an individual condition that is best experienced without others. 
Arendt criticizes Mill for conceiving of freedom as a retreat into the “inward space into 
which men may escape from external coercion and feel free.”44 As Arendt suggests, 
Mill’s individualist conception of freedom is really only achievable if one escapes 
politics altogether. 
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 While Arendt focuses largely on proponents of individualist theories of freedom, 
she also criticizes Jean-Jacques Rousseau for his notion of the “general will” and 
collective sovereignty. In an ideal state, Rousseau wrote, “the citizens had no 
communications one with another” as “each citizen should think only his own 
thoughts.”45 Arendt denounces Rousseau’s theory of freedom as tyrannical because she 
believes that sovereignty, whether individual or collective, is in fact an illusion that 
undermines freedom. According to Arendt, Rousseau’s likening of freedom to 
sovereignty “is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the 
philosophical equation of freedom and free will.” As she further explains, equating 
freedom and sovereignty, “leads to either a denial of freedom—namely, if it is realized 
that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign—or to the insight that the freedom 
of one man, or a group, or a body politic can be purchased only at the price of freedom, 
i.e., the sovereignty of all others.”46 In this passage, Arendt exposes Rousseau’s 
definition of freedom as not only problematic but in fact oppressive. Rousseau’s notion of 
the general will is intended to liberate people from the chains of civil society; however, as 
Arendt points out, a sovereign collective may be just as oppressive as any other form of 
governing body. Rousseau’s theory that individuals are capable of reaching a collective 
or general consensus is not supported by the history of political organization. In its actual 
manifestation, collective sovereignty would likely require a lower class of men over 
which its power can be exerted and thus might yield freedom’s antithesis.   
 Arendt goes a step further than merely discrediting Rousseau’s association 
between freedom and sovereignty, arguing that “freedom and sovereignty are so little 
identical that they cannot even exist simultaneously.” As she continues, “Where men 
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wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups, they must submit to the 
oppression of the will, be this the individual will with which I force myself, or the 
“general will” of an organized group. If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty 
they must renounce.”47 Here Arendt once again illuminates sovereignty’s dependence on 
oppression. This dependence relates to the claim put forth in the first chapter that the 
freedom sought by those who fought in the American Revolution was lost in the drafting 
of the Constitution. In the Federalist 10, James Madison discussed the need for a 
governing body to arbitrate between individual wills, ascertain the “collective interest,” 
and finally act on behalf of this “collective interest.” As I argued in the first chapter, by 
endowing representatives with such a task, citizens were excluded from the public realm 
within which the governing process took place. In this case, sovereignty for “the people” 
as a collective and purportedly unified entity was purchased at the expense of the 
freedom of actual citizens. 
 Important to reinforce for the purposes of this chapter is the tripartite distinction 
Arendt makes between Mill’s “inner freedom,” Rousseau’s “general will,” and her own 
definition of freedom. Arendt’s conception, like Rousseau’s, requires a public space and 
is a condition that can only be experienced by a group. However, unlike Rousseau, 
Arendt acknowledges the difficulty, if not impossibility, of reaching a coherent consensus 
on complex political questions. Her goal is not to ascertain a “general will” but merely to 
secure a public space in which civic-mindedness and lively debate might triumph. For 
Arendt, individuals can only experience freedom through interrelation with others, as 
only through our interactions with others are we alerted of our capacity for freedom: “We 
first become aware of freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with others, not in the 
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intercourse with ourselves.”48 While liberation may be possible in isolation, Arendt 
contends that “freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation, the company of other men 
who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them—a 
politically organized world, in other words, into which each of the free men could insert 
himself by word and deed.”49 Thus, we need others in order to experience freedom, and 
we need a public political space within which we can engage others. It is from this 
foundation that we can elaborate upon the conception of freedom that will be put forth in 
this chapter. 
Part II. The Interdependence of Freedoms and the Appeal 
 Though Arendt has provided us with a convincing argument that freedom cannot 
be experienced in isolation, the challenge becomes finding a way to articulate the 
interconnected relationship between human freedoms. For this endeavor, Simone de 
Beauvoir is useful, as she contends that the freedoms of respective individuals are not 
only interrelated, but actually mutually dependent. She claims in “Pyrrhus and Cineas” 
that one cannot affirm his freedom without first affirming the freedom of others: 
“Respect for the other’s freedom is not an abstract rule. It is the first condition of my 
successful effort. I can only appeal to the other’s freedom, not constrain it.”50 In this 
passage Beauvoir introduces two concepts that are extremely important. First, as an 
individual in the world I am dependent upon others: I can only achieve freedom for 
myself through respecting the freedom of others. Second, for the purposes of achieving 
my freedom, I must appeal to the other’s freedom in a way that enables his pursuit and 
does not inhibit it. As she writes, “The other’s freedom alone is capable of necessitating 
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my being. My essential need is therefore to be faced with free men…we need others in 
order for our existence to become founded and necessary.”51  
 Beauvoir also develops in her essay the concept of “situated freedom,” or the idea 
that an individual is responsible for determining the conditions within which others act. 
Beauvoir writes, “Each of my actions by falling into the world creates a new situation for 
him. I must assume these actions.”52 On the surface, this theory may seem like a simple 
call for individual accountability; however, it is actually a demand for far more. As she 
explains, we are not merely responsible for our actions but for the constant and inevitable 
impact that we have on the world that we share with others:  
What concerns me is the other’s situation, as something founded by me. One must 
not believe that I could elude the responsibility for that situation on the pretext 
that the other is free. That is his business not mine. I am responsible for what I 
can do, for what I am doing. There is a convenient and false way of thinking that 
authorizes all abstentions, all tyrannies…but only the impoverished man can 
declare himself free in the midst of his misery. In abstaining from helping him, I 
am the very face of that misery. The freedom that rejects or accepts it absolutely 
does not exist for me. It exists only for the one in whom it is realized. It is not in 
his name; it is in the name of my freedom that I can accept or reject it.53 
 
In other words, upon entering into the world we are in constant interaction with the 
freedoms of others, and can choose to constrain or appeal to these freedoms. But 
regardless of what we choose, and especially if we do not choose, we still bear 
responsibility for the situation that we provide for others. In this sense, we are never and 
can never be exempted of responsibility in those instances where we come into contact 
with the freedom of another: “I am the facticity of his situation,” asserts Beauvoir. “The 
fate that weighs on the other is always us…Immobile or in action, we always weigh upon 
the earth. Every refusal is a choice, every silence has a voice. Our very passivity is 
willed; in order to not choose, we still must choose not to choose. It is impossible to 
 41 
escape.”54 Thus, an individual’s freedom is at once dependent upon others and depended 
upon by others; he is always responsible for everything with which he comes into 
contact. Far from the classical philosophical notion of freedom as a retreat from the 
world, Beauvoir asserts that once we enter the world we can never actually escape, for we 
are in continual and unavoidable interaction with the world and with others. 
 When we combine Arendt’s and Beauvoir’s insights regarding the 
interconnectivity between human freedoms, we are able to reach a robust definition that 
challenges the definition put forth by Mill. Freedom is no longer a means of exemption or 
escape, but is instead a condition that is inextricably bound to responsibility. In pursuing 
our freedom we cannot escape the influence that we will inevitably have on the freedoms 
of others. Their combined definition seems far more plausible than that of Mill, but we 
are still left with the question of how exactly we can and should interact with one another 
and particularly, in Beauvoir’s terms, how we can “appeal” to the other’s freedom.  
 Beauvoir has a response to this question regarding the appeal: language. As she 
explains, “language is an appeal to the other’s freedom since the sign is only a sign 
through a consciousness that grasps it again…All men are free, and as soon as we deal 
with them we experience their freedom.” Through language, we are able to recognize and 
come into contact with another’s freedom. In our pursuit of freedom we can choose not to 
address others and instead ignore them, as Mill might suggest, but Beauvoir asserts that 
this would effectively disenable our own pursuit: “If we want to disregard these 
dangerous freedoms, we must turn away from men. But then our being draws back and 
loses itself. Our being realizes itself only by choosing to be in danger in the world, in 
danger before the foreign and divided freedoms that take hold of it.”55 Once again, we 
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can only achieve freedom through engaging and recognizing the freedoms of others, and 
language is crucially important for doing this. 
 As the next section will show, when we seek to apply this theoretical framework 
to interactions in the physical world, we arrive at a number of challenges. In the 
discussion that follows I will examine the First Amendment, which governs speech in the 
U.S., to illuminate the interconnected reality of individual freedoms, but also to expose 
the propensity for conflict and confrontation between individuals in their exercises of 
freedom. Beauvoir tells us that “any speech, any expression is an appeal; true contempt is 
silence.”56 However, certain forms of speech inhibit the freedom of another instead of 
appealing to it and make us question whether or not an appeal is always possible when 
there exist what would seem to be irreconcilable conflicts. We must consider particular 
ways of addressing one another that may undermine our respective pursuits of freedom. 
Part III. Hate and the First Amendment: Addressing Speech’s Paradoxical 
Capabilities 
 “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” As stated in the 
First Amendment, the right to free speech seems simple enough. The rights outlined in 
the First Amendment are considered by many to be the cornerstone of American liberal 
democracy and the building block upon which all subsequent legal rights have been 
developed. But despite its seeming clarity, the First Amendment has for some time been a 
source of controversy, largely due to its lack of specificity regarding what speech, if any, 
should not be protected.  
 In Beauvoir’s terms, it would seem that the First Amendment importantly enables 
our pursuit of freedom by allowing us to appeal to the freedoms of others. In “Pyrrhus 
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and Cineas,” she describes the two conditions that must be met in order for the appeal to 
be possible: “First, I must be allowed to appeal. I will therefore struggle against those 
who want to stifle my voice, prevent me from expressing myself, and prevent me from 
being…Next, I must have before me men who are free for me, who can respond to my 
appeal.”57 These conditions are particularly important when considered in the context of 
debates regarding the scope of the First Amendment. Many politicians, activists, and 
theorists have rightly identified the threat posed by violent or hateful speech; however, 
their proposal to develop a legal means by which to limit such speech would seemingly 
deny Beauvoir’s first condition: our ability to appeal. On the other hand, through 
Beauvoir’s analysis we can see why attempts have been made to legally regulate hate 
speech. Hateful speech acts deny Beauvoir’s second condition, as they are committed 
with the intent of dehumanizing their target and stripping him of his ability to respond to 
the initial appeal. In this sense, Beauvoir’s discussion illuminates the complexity of 
regulating hate speech, but does not direct us toward a legal solution. 
 If we accept for the time being that there may be no legal means by which to 
compromise between protecting free speech rights and curtailing injurious speech, then 
are we forced to accept a world in which anything goes? In our discussion at the 
beginning of this chapter we established that individuals can never be isolated in the 
world, that individual freedoms are in continuous interaction with one another, and that 
each of us is responsible for our constant and inevitable impact in determining the 
conditions within which other human beings act. Thus, absent legal recourse, we must 
aim to reach a conceptualization of speech capable of allocating responsibility for certain 
speech acts without encroaching upon a fundamental civil and political right.  
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 In Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Judith Butler seeks to arrive 
at such a conceptualization. Butler recognizes the quandary that we find ourselves in 
when we try to regulate certain kinds of speech. As she explains: 
It is therefore impossible to regulate fully the potentially injurious effects of 
language without destroying something fundamental about language and, more 
specifically, about the subject’s constitution in language. On the other hand, a 
critical perspective on the kinds of language that govern the regulation and 
constitution of subjects becomes all the more imperative once we realize how 
inevitable is our dependency on the ways we are addressed in order to exercise 
any agency at all.58  
 
In this passage, Butler alludes to the dangers of regulating language. We are dependent 
upon language, she argues, for it is only through being addressed that we are brought into 
being as subjects.  
 The key to understanding Butler’s assertion is her notion of agency, and 
particularly the agency of the subject who performs a speech act and an agency that she 
contends is ascribed to language itself through the act of utterance. As with Beauvoir, 
who asserts that through appealing to another’s freedom we recognize him and thus bring 
him into being, Butler believes that we constitute others through verbal address. In her 
words, “the act of recognition becomes an act of constitution: the address animates the 
subject into existence.”59 Thus, it is the constitutive capacity of language that makes 
regulating language difficult and even dangerous. Furthermore, as she explains, “the body 
is alternately sustained and threatened through modes of address.” In this sense, 
regulating speech in the hopes of limiting its ability to threaten and injure would also 
destroy language’s ability to constitute and sustain individuals, and thus would deprive 
individuals of an agency that can only be enabled by language. According to Butler, “it is 
by being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the 
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body first becomes possible.” Therefore, just as we need to appeal to the other’s freedom 
in order to achieve freedom for ourselves, we need to be addressed and to address others 
in order to be brought into social existence. Most importantly, only through being 
addressed does our acquisition of agency become possible. 
 This notion of acquiring agency through language has serious implications for our 
comparative assessments of individualist conceptions of freedom and those more public 
and interconnected notions as envisioned by Beauvoir and Arendt. Butler argues that 
through addressing one another we become vulnerable and accessible to each other, and 
that once addressed we can no longer ever return to isolation. Striking a tone very similar 
to that of Beauvoir, Butler stresses this point: “The address that inaugurates the 
possibility of agency, in a single stroke, forecloses the possibility of radical autonomy.”60 
Put another way, Butler, much like Arendt, believes that no man is ever sovereign. For 
Butler, among the most important implications of language is that it shatters the illusion 
of sovereignty and replaces it with agency. As she asserts, “whereas some critics mistake 
the critique of sovereignty for the demolition of agency, I propose that agency begins 
where sovereignty wanes.”61 Echoing Arendt’s point regarding the mutual exclusivity of 
freedom and sovereignty, Butler does not believe that there exists an alternative to this 
interconnected vision for the world. Her analysis instead reveals the ways in which we 
ironically depend upon language but are also vulnerable to being threatened by it.  
 In addition to the agency of the subject that is developed through address, Butler 
asserts that language has its own distinct yet related form of agency. As Shoshana Felman 
explains In The Scandal of the Speaking Body, the relationship between language and the 
body is a complicated one, consisting at once of “incongruity and inseparability.”62 
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Because of this relationship, there can never be a “fully intentional speech act.”63 To the 
contrary, all such acts are partially “unknowing,” or blind about their effect in the sense 
that, as Butler asserts, “the speech act says more, or says differently, than it means to 
say.”64 For both Butler and Felman, this acknowledgment of the unpredictability and 
spontaneity of speech is essential for assessing the intent and impact of certain kinds of 
speech. As Butler explains in describing the reasons for her writing this book, all speech 
is “excitable” to the extent that it “is always in some ways out of our control.”65 
 Butler’s and Felman’s combined notion of linguistic agency might appear to 
liberate the subject of responsibility; however, separating the speech act from its 
consequences may actually enable us to better establish responsibility for certain speech 
acts. Through distinguishing the act from its effects Butler undermines the common 
inclination in critical hate speech discourse to seek to establish exclusive guilt on the part 
of the utterer. Butler calls this inclination the “sovereign conceit,” as “the one who speaks 
hate speech is imagined to wield sovereign power, to do what he or she says when it is 
said.”66 As Butler’s argument reveals, when discussions about violent speech are diluted 
to simply establishing guilt for physical acts, we are inclined to envision subjects as 
sovereign and thus deny their embeddedness in the world. The disagreement becomes 
one that can never be resolved regarding the normative reach of free speech. For this 
reason, Butler offers an alternative suggestion: “Untethering the speech act from the 
sovereign subject founds an alternative notion of agency and, ultimately, of 
responsibility, one that more fully acknowledges that way in which the subject is 
constituted in language, how what it creates is also what it derives from elsewhere.”67 
Much like Beauvoir’s theory regarding our embeddedness in the world, Butler’s theory 
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similarly takes into account the way in which we constitute and are constituted by others 
through our interactions with them. Her theory liberates us from the individualist 
framework that empowers and perpetuates circular arguments over blame and guilt, and 
instead forces all of us to rethink the ways in which we conceive of and establish 
responsibility. 
Violent Speech in an Increasingly Accessible Media Age 
 
 In order to reach a new way of thinking about responsibility in instances of hate 
speech, Butler argues that we must embrace the “gap that separates the speech act from 
its future effects.” She claims that the gap between act and injury “has its auspicious 
implications,” for “it begins a theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to 
the relentless search for legal remedy.”68 This gap, while often ignored or unrecognized, 
is at the heart of disagreement regarding hateful speech. How can we assess the injury of 
a speech act that merely incites violence or provokes hate, but does not act upon these 
violent or hateful tendencies? 
 The challenge of answering this question is nowhere clearer than in addressing 
today’s media pundits’ and their reliance upon hateful and angry speech as a means of 
attracting and maintaining an audience. Mostly, this question has been left in abeyance as 
advocates for censorship or even just “responsible media” have found themselves in a 
seemingly inescapable legal quandary. But On July 17, 2010 the influence of violent 
speech in the media became manifest when Byron Williams, a previously convicted felon 
who was stopped by police for speeding and driving erratically on I-580 in Oakland, 
California, told police that media pundit Glenn Beck had inspired him to “start a 
revolution by traveling to San Francisco and killing people of importance at the Tides 
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Foundation and the ACLU."69 After a shootout that lasted twelve minutes, a wounded 
Williams was finally subdued and arrested by the California State Police. Williams, who 
had been wearing body armor, had fired a fully loaded handgun, rifle, and shotgun at 
police. After being taken to the hospital for treatment of gunshot wounds, he revealed to 
police his intention to harm members of the two organizations. 
 The Tides Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which 
respectively seek to promote social justice and advocate individual rights, would seem to 
be unlikely targets for a deranged and desperate criminal. But according to Williams, it 
was media pundit Glenn Beck who had inspired his hatred and venom toward Tides and 
the ACLU through various rants on his television show on Fox News. "I would have 
never started watching Fox News if it wasn't for the fact that Beck was on there,” 
Williams told the media watchdog organization Media Matters for America, “and it was 
the things that he did, it was the things he exposed that blew my mind."70 According to 
Media Matters, “Beck had attacked Tides 29 times on his Fox News show in the year-
and-a-half leading up to the shooting,” indicting the organization as part of a supposed 
money-laundering conspiracy directed by Barack Obama, George Soros, and Petrobras 
Oil Company.71 The Christian Science Monitor reports, “Beck has referred to Tides as 
‘bullies’ and ‘thugs’ whose mission is to ‘warp your children's brains and make sure they 
know how evil capitalism is.’” Recently, the self-proclaimed “progressive hunter” had 
warned the foundation “I’m coming for you.”72 It is clear that Beck and other right-wing 
media pundits informed Williams’ antipathy toward these groups, but can they actually 
be held in any way responsible for Williams’ actions? 
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 In the wake of the incident, progressive organizations and newspapers vilified 
Beck for inciting violence. The Tides Foundation Founder and CEO Drummond Pike 
wrote an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle shortly after the incident and spoke of the 
“obligation of every American, especially those whose voices are amplified by the media, 
to foster civil discourse and dialogue among those who may disagree about public 
matters.”73 A few months later, after the connection between Beck and Williams had 
been better established, Pike wrote a letter to companies that advertised on Fox News, 
urging them to stop advertising on the channel or risk being among the many with blood 
on their hands.74 Rich Roberts, of the International Union of Police Associations, charged 
that “The Becks of the world are people who are venting their opinions and it is 
inflammatory.”75 But Pike, Roberts, and others were seemingly grappling with an 
unavoidable fact: there exists no legal means by which to punish this kind of hateful 
speech, even if it evidently incites violence. 
 Judith Butler discusses extensively the frustrations of those who wish to punish 
individuals for using language that threatens or endangers. “Those who seek to fix with 
any certainty the link between certain speech acts and their injurious effects will surely 
lament the open temporality of the speech act,” writes Butler. “That no speech act has to 
perform injury as its effect means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a 
standard by which the injuries of speech might be effectively adjudicated.”76 
 As illustrated in the Beck case, Beck’s intimidation tactics did not perform a particular 
injury, but instead merely exposed the targeted parties as vulnerable to a certain type of 
threatening address. 
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 The Beck-Williams case illuminates the interconnected reality of human freedoms 
and discredits individualist claims of freedom. Beck’s exercise of free speech rights 
shaped the conditions within which Byron Williams acted, and Williams’ actions had 
tangible consequences for the police officers who were caught in his line of fire. But 
calling for a legal response to Beck’s rhetoric, by focusing on the injury committed by 
Williams, would not only undermine freedom of speech rights but would further 
empower Beck by attributing to him a sovereign influence in shaping the thoughts of 
others. Moreover, such a claim could lead us into an unending debate over the extent of 
guilt for a particular though physically unidentifiable injury. Conversely, if we abandon 
this causal framework, we can seek a new method of allocating and articulating 
responsibility. 
 In Williams’ interviews with reporters after the incident, he revealed that Beck’s 
approach, as well as the chalkboard he used, reminded him of school. Most importantly, 
because Beck directly addresses his audience, Williams came to view him as a teacher, 
and one to whom he felt increasingly accessible. It is important to realize that while 
Beck’s targets were new, his material, much like that of a grade school teacher, was 
recycled. Just as a grade school teacher renews the strength of the Bill of Rights by 
reading the ten amendments to the class, Beck revitalized old claims of leftist conspiracy 
theories by recontextualizing them. The claims Beck makes on his show do not originate 
or emanate from him, but instead are repeated and rearticulated by him. Origination, 
which attributes sovereign creative capacity to the speaking subject, is different from 
repetition, which conversely imagines the speaking subject as a human sponge who utters 
what he derives from elsewhere. Butler explains this distinction well: “The legal effort to 
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curb injurious speech tends to isolate the ‘speaker’ as the culpable agent…the 
responsibility of the speaker is thus misconstrued…the speaker renews the linguistic 
tokens of a community, reissuing and reinvigorating such speech. Responsibility is thus 
linked with speech as repetition, not as origination.”77 If we acknowledge and emphasize 
that a speech act is neither fully contextual nor fully sovereign, then we are able to 
embrace our embedded existence in the world and its implications for articulating and 
allocating responsibility in instances of hate speech. 
 Using this framework, we can undertake the complex task of assessing Beck’s 
culpability. As Butler states,  
The one who utters hate speech is responsible for the manner in which such 
speech is repeated, for reinvigorating such speech, for reestablishing contexts of 
hate and injury. The responsibility of the speaker does not consist of remaking 
language ex nihilo, but rather of negotiating the legacies of usage that constrain 
and enable that speaker’s speech. To understand this sense of responsibility, one 
afflicted with impurity from the start, requires that we understand the speaker as 
formed in the language that he or she also uses.78  
 
Thus, with Butler’s assistance, we can assert that Beck is responsible for exploiting our 
state of vulnerability to one another as a condition founded through language. We are 
able to recognize that Beck’s words had an impact not because they were unique, but 
because they invoked and renewed conspiracy theories that had lain dormant since the 
most recent democratic presidency, and because he made these theories accessible to us 
once again. Beck illustrates the paradox of language, which, as Butler has told us, is at 
once capable of sustaining and threatening existence. 
The Loss of Linguistic Agency Through Legal Articulation 
 While embracing the “gap” between intention and injury leads us to a more 
profound articulation of responsibility in the Beck case, those in favor of legally 
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regulating hate speech have often tried to ignore or even close this “gap” so as to punish 
the responsible individuals. In Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive 
Speech, and the First Amendment the four authors seek to fix the link between speech 
acts and their injurious effects in order to assert the need for a legal revision or 
rearticulation of the First Amendment. Their assertion, when applied to the Beck case, 
raises the question of how to establish guilt on the part of a subject who commits a 
hateful speech act when faced with a legal standard that relies almost exclusively on 
physical evidence. 
 The legal need for physical evidence raises a challenge to those hoping to put 
people like Beck behind bars, but it also illustrates the inadequacy of the law in 
responding to and rectifying instances of hate speech. The four authors of Words that 
Wound, in their admirable quest for a more just and humane world, fail in my view to 
recognize the inability of the legal system to respond to the demands imposed upon it by 
hate speech. As they assert in the introduction,  “In this book we use the words of law and 
politics to fight the words that wound and exclude. We seek a legal system that 
recognizes and remedies the harm of the structures of have and have-not, and we express 
our solidarity with all who join us in that quest.”79 The solution proposed in this book is 
to use the instruments of the law to respond to the challenges posed by hate speech, but I 
argue that the legal system is not capable of “recognizing and remedying” the highly 
complex and deeply ingrained societal structures that enable and encourage hateful 
speech. Moreover, by coercing hate speech narratives into the limiting confines of a legal 
context, the traumas experienced by victims of hate speech are largely lost, for the law 
cannot encapsulate them. 
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 In my view, the attempt in Words that Wound to articulate the traumatic narratives 
of hateful speech in legal language raises an important consequence for society as a 
whole. In the final page of the introduction, the four authors assert the gravity of the issue 
they are taking up: 
“What is ultimately at stake in this debate is our vision for this society. We are in 
this fight about the first amendment because it is more than a fight about how to 
balance one individual’s freedom of speech against another individual’s freedom 
from injury. This is a fight about the substantive content that we will give to the 
ideals of freedom and equality—how we will construct ‘freedom,’ as a 
constitutional premise and a defining principle of democracy.”80  
 
While they are aware of the larger implications of this discussion, it is central to my 
argument that the law is unable to give “substantive content” to freedom. Only through 
understanding our embededness in the world, a condition which the law has to this point 
proven incapable of recognizing, can substantive freedom be achieved. In trying to 
establish guilt on the part of the utterer of violent speech, the authors of Words that 
Wound ascribe sovereignty to the speaker and a “magical efficacy to words,”81 both of 
which deny the interconnected nature of human freedoms. The law requires that a link 
between act and effect be established, however, the mere attempt to establish such a link 
in the case of hateful speech compounds the threat posed by the speech act itself. 
Specifically, it deprives the act of its traumatic context as an experience of repeated 
suffering for the victim and as a traumatic injury whose enclosure within a traditional 
causal framework serves to prolong the victim’s loss of agency. 
The Inadequacy of the Law 
 A recent case before the Supreme Court revealed the limits of the law in 
addressing hate speech. Snyder v. Phelps, heard by the Supreme Court in October 2010, 
pitted Albert Snyder, the father of a U.S. Marine who had died in the war in Iraq, against 
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the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas, which had protested at the funeral of 
Snyder’s son. Westboro Church claims “God is punishing the United States for its 
tolerance of homosexuality by killing its soldiers. ”82 The church consistently uses 
military funerals as one of many venues to promote its message. After the protests at his 
son’s funeral, Mr. Snyder sued the church for invasion of privacy and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and was awarded $11 million by a federal district court; 
however, the church won its subsequent appeal of the ruling on First Amendment 
grounds. On March 2nd, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Westboro Church, 
asserting in an 8-to-1 decision that protests at funerals constitute protected speech.83 
 The oral arguments presented on October 6, 2010 provide a good sense of how 
legal language falls short in articulating the injuries resulting from hate speech. From the 
outset, the trauma experienced by Mr. Snyder and many others was marginalized in favor 
of the competing legal narratives of the free speech rights of the protestors and the 
privacy rights of the mourners. Justices Ginsberg, Kagan, and Scalia questioned both the 
prosecution and the defense in order to determine whether or not the First Amendment 
protected the protests. Justice Ginsberg in particular probed the prosecutor, Sean 
Summers, seeking to identify a victim and, in doing so, to establish a link between the 
speech act and the emotional injury. As Ginsberg pointed out, members of the same 
church had protested at the State Capitol and Annapolis earlier the same day. They had 
used almost all of the same signs at all three protests, thus begging the question of 
whether “those signs targeted the family rather than the whole U.S. society.”84 Through 
her line of questioning, Ginsberg highlighted the need for a link between the speech act 
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and a particular victim in order to deem the church’s speech unprotected by the First 
Amendment and thus an invasion of privacy. 
 In Snyder v. Phelps the verdict, though legally significant, is rendered emotionally 
meaningless for the simple fact that the traumatic effect of the speech act cannot be 
rectified through legal compensation. In this case, the collective trauma, inflicted by the 
hateful speech act and experienced by not only the Snyder family but also by countless 
gay soldiers who have been vilified and victimized for their military service, cannot be 
encapsulated within the competing legal narratives of First Amendment Rights and 
Privacy Rights. As Butler argues, hate speech is effective largely because of its ability to 
perform and repeat the ritual of subordination, specifically by reenacting the violence 
committed against a marginalized or oppressed group.85 In Snyder v. Phelps, Westboro 
Church’s verbal assault served to resubordinate gay soldiers whose prolonged and 
habitual suffering can largely be attributed to their having to conceal their identities in 
order to serve in the military, thereby forfeiting their agency at the time they enlist. By 
repeating the language used to validate past hate crimes, the members of Westboro 
reenacted violence against gay people, but made such language newly accessible through 
claiming that gay service members were responsible for wartime deaths. Unfortunately, 
because of the demands of justice and the methodology of the nation’s highest court, the 
legal proceedings in the Snyder case did not provide gay service members with a means 
of responding to these acts of subordination, but instead “denied their claim to 
visibility.”86  
 I emphasize the inadequacy of the law as an instrument for addressing the trauma 
of hate speech because how we respond to certain speech acts largely dictates the ways in 
 56 
which words will be repeated and rearticulated. Butler emphasizes the importance of 
responding to hate speech in such a way that agency is not forfeited but instead 
reclaimed: 
“The language that counters the injuries of the speech, however, must repeat those 
injuries without precisely reenacting them. Such a strategy affirms that hate 
speech does not destroy the agency required for a critical response. Those who 
argue that hate speech produces a ‘victim class’ deny critical agency and tend to 
support an intervention in which agency is fully assumed by the state. In place of 
state-sponsored censorship, a social and cultural struggle of language takes place 
in which agency is derived from injury, and injury countered through that very 
derivation.”87  
 
In this passage, Butler asserts that we cannot simply ignore a hate speech act, but that the 
nature of the response is crucially important. Echoing Kristin Bumiller, who argues that 
state intervention renders the victim helpless by framing issues “in terms of legal 
discourse,”88 Butler denounces state regulation for necessitating the forfeiture of agency 
by the victim. Thus, an effective response to hate speech must address and even repeat 
the speech act while not reenacting its violence or reinforcing its subordinating effect. 
 In conceptualizing such a response, Butler consults Toni Morrison, who argues 
that hate speech threatens the very existence of language, and that the struggle over the 
future of language is won and lost through its resignification. In Morrison’s 1993 Nobel 
Lecture in Literature, she tells the following parable: “young children play a cruel joke 
and ask a blind woman to guess whether the bird that is in their hands is living or dead. 
The blind woman responds by refusing and displacing the question: ‘I don’t know…but 
what I do know is that it is in your hands. It is in your hands.”’89 For Morrison, the blind 
woman is a practiced writer and the bird symbolizes language. The blind woman’s refusal 
to answer the children’s question “shifts attention away from the assertions of power to 
the instrument through which that power is exercised.”90 As Butler explains, when 
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language seeks to “‘encapsulate’ or ‘capture’ the events and lives it describes…it 
acquires its own violent force… The violence of language consists in its effort to capture 
the ineffable and, hence, to destroy it, to seize hold of that which must remain elusive for 
language to operate as a living thing.”91 Conversely, the woman’s response constitutes a 
refusal to “effect that capture,”92 and is thus a means of restoring and revitalizing 
language. Instead of answering the children’s cruel question, which would have deprived 
her of agency, the woman recasts their question as one of responsibility, particularly over 
the future of language. As Butler and Morrison reveal in this parable, through 
resignifying hate speech, such speech can be effectively countered and the victim of 
hateful utterances can reclaim his agency.  
 The woman’ response is also significant because of its orientation toward the 
future of language. Hate speech threatens language by seeking to deprive both it and its 
addressee of agency. Thus, the way we respond to hate speech is essential to whether or 
not language lives or dies. As Butler asserts at the end of the introduction, 
Indeed, as we think about worlds that might one day become thinkable, sayable, 
legible, the opening up of the foreclosed and the saying of the unspeakable 
become part of the very “offense” that must be committed in order to expand the 
domain of linguistic survival. The resigni-fication of speech requires opening new 
contexts, speaking in ways that have never yet been legitimated, and hence 
producing legitimation in new and future forms.93  
 
Butler’s vision for language is empowering on an individual level and revolutionary on a 
societal one, providing a call to action that demands our reclamation of agency and our 
acceptance of responsibility for our embeddedness in the world. 
∗  ∗  ∗  
 By breaking from the classical theoretical inclination of equating freedom with 
individuality and sovereignty, in this chapter I have instead conceived of freedoms as 
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interconnected and interdependent, as well as tied to mutual responsibility. Departing 
from this highly abstract foundation, I have explored in more tangible terms the 
implications of such a conception of freedom in terms of its effect on human interactions. 
With the help of Simone de Beauvoir, I recognized that one must appeal to the freedoms 
of others through language. Judith Butler illuminated the importance of agency in 
enabling such an appeal.  
 The second part of this chapter focused on hate speech in the U.S. because such 
speech threatens agency and thus threatens our freedom. How we respond to hate speech 
is important, as the response can either restore our interconnectivity, and in doing so 
reestablish the potential for freedom, or it can seek to isolate individuals and further 
deprive them of agency. A legal response to hate speech may well constitute the latter 
option, as it appropriates the injury of the victim in order to decrease our accessibility to 
one another and deny our freedom. Instead, hate speech must be countered in a way that 
resignifies speech and reclaims the agency that the hateful speech act was intended to 
deprive us of. Such a response transforms the nature of the appeal and restores the 
possibility for freedom. Moreover, it recognizes our vulnerability to one another, and 
accepts our responsibility for how we repeat language and thus how we enable the 
freedoms of others. 
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Chapter III. Globalization and the Politics of Exclusion 
 
“There is a fundamental, and dangerous, idea behind the very idea of the modern nation-
state, the idea of a ‘national ethnos.’ No modern nation, however, benign its political 
system and however eloquent its public voices may be about the virtues of tolerance, 
multiculturalism, and inclusion, is free of the idea that national sovereignty is built on 
some sort of ethnic genius.”94 
–Arjun Appadurai 
  
 In Chapter Two I considered the consequences of individualist conceptions of 
freedom with a focus on speech. I used incidents of hateful speech to support my claim—
derived from similar claims made by Arendt and Beauvoir—that we have a constant and 
inevitable impact on the world and on others. I argued that the ways in which we interact 
with one another enable or disenable our respective pursuits of freedom, and thus that 
freedom can only be achieved through others. In Chapter One I examined how the 
establishment of a Constitution and Bill of Rights served to limit the exercise of freedom 
by U.S. citizens. I highlighted the dangerous argument posed by James Madison in 
Federalist 10 that regulating freedom may be necessary in the interest of protecting 
citizens from the dangers of faction. Most importantly, however, I considered America’s 
problematic orientation to its founding moments and to a past that some of its citizens 
and public servants glorify insincerely and appropriate illegitimately for political means. I 
argued that Madison’s disdain for minority opinions and disregard for the voices of 
marginalized groups importantly enabled this form of contemporary appropriation of the 
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founding moments, whereby visions of a homogeneous past that never existed are 
nostalgically invoked.  
 When we juxtapose my argument in Chapter Two regarding the 
interconnectedness of human freedoms with the legal argument made by Madison and 
repeated in contemporary discourse, we find that there is considerable tension between a 
system of legal rights that seeks to mediate between the exercise of individual freedoms 
and a theoretical contention (validated in reality) that claims such mediation is never fully 
possible. I recognize that my argument may be uncomfortable for some in that it leaves 
individuals without legal remedy for complex conflicts of freedom; however, accepting 
my argument that our pursuit of freedom is profoundly impacted by others, and vice 
versa, might make individuals more inclined to collaborate with one another in 
recognition of shared interests. On the other hand, if one chooses to endorse the 
Madisonian claim that freedom is a matter of rights, that some individuals should be 
afforded certain rights and others should not be, and that rights must be limited in the 
interest of the “public good,” then we arrive at a highly troubling conception of freedom 
as bound with conflict, power struggles, and winning and losing. I argue that this 
position—elaborated upon in Chapter One and long reflected in American political 
discourse —is magnified by the global challenges of today. Put another way, America’s 
reactionary and exclusionary response to recent global phenomena can be traced back to 
its origins, and to the establishment of a government endowed with the task of mediating 
between individual claims to rights and deciding which individuals and groups deserve 
rights. 
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 In On Democracy, published in 1998, Robert Dahl predicted that more 
heterogeneous populations would be destabilizing to democracy.95 So far, Dahl has been 
proven right. The influx of people of a race, ethnicity, or religion different from that 
embodied by the majority of citizens has yielded startling effects, not only in the United 
States but throughout much of the western democratic world (and, though not relevant to 
my argument, throughout much of the non-democratic world as well). Globalization, 
once projected to bring a new age of cooperation and cohesion, has exacerbated 
preexisting tensions along potentially divisive lines. Instead of prompting unity, 
globalization has produced a tendency toward fear and exclusion that has manifested 
itself in political, social, economic, and religious policies toward groups and individuals 
deemed “foreign.” None of these policies follow the tradition of inclusion and 
accessibility that is central to theoretical governance by the “demos.” 
 To many, this phenomenon seems counterintuitive. After all, in the U.S. we send 
thousands of American students to study abroad each year to immerse themselves in 
another culture, with the assumption that increased exposure to people of a different way 
of life will generate a more worldly and accepting citizenry. Therefore, why wouldn’t 
bringing the “study abroad experience” to our backyards have a similar effect? For those 
who dreamed of a world without conflict, globalization seemed to be the cure; however, 
twelve years after Dahl’s prophecy, we can confidently assert that he was right and the 
optimists were wrong. 
 In this chapter I will use Dahl’s prediction as a jumping off point, but not as an 
all-encompassing response to the trends we are witnessing today. I will argue that our 
conception of freedom was always vulnerable to appropriation by such exclusionary and 
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intolerant ideologies; globalization just brought our fears of foreignness to the fore. 
Purported outsiders have been excluded and alienated in the U.S. throughout the 
country’s history, from the subjugation of African slaves to the expulsion of Native 
Americans from their land. However, the ways that policies of exclusion are being 
carried out—by public figures and concerned citizens alike—are unique. While previous 
exclusionary measures emphasized the existence of a moral or providential hierarchy to 
justify an outright claim to superiority, contemporary methods stress loss as a byproduct 
of change. More specifically, contemporary policies of exclusion are justified through 
convincing citizens that including these groups will directly and adversely impact them, 
their rights, and their freedom. The driving forces behind this increasingly antithetical 
relationship between freedom and the “outsider” will be fleshed out in this chapter. 
 Arendt and Beauvoir, in contrast with Locke and James Madison, have given us a 
foundation for the claims that will be made in this chapter, but we will need to consult 
contemporary theorists in order to build upon their arguments regarding freedom. Paul 
Passavant, Bonnie Honig, Arjun Appadurai, and Wendy Brown are all are concerned 
with the relationships between nationalism and globalization, rights and exclusion, 
national identity and citizenship, and intolerance and freedom.  
 Paul Passavant will be particularly useful, as he will argue persuasively that 
liberal rights and nationalism are inherently correlated, and that each one enables and 
enhances the other. From this premise, I will consider how globalization magnifies the 
relationship between nationalism and rights. I will argue that exclusionary responses to 
globalization follow the ideological tradition of the contemporary nation-state, namely, 
the idea that the nation-state should be sovereign and superior. I will also consult Wendy 
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Brown in examining how nation-states’ diminishing ability to exercise absolute 
sovereignty in protecting their borders has generated fear in both states and citizens and 
has produced various irrational responses to the perceived problem of foreignness. I will 
argue that these responses, though incapable of yielding their desired results, derive from 
a conceptual linkage between freedom and sovereignty that undermines the principles of 
substantive freedom that I have outlined in the previous chapters.   
 Finally, I will apply the conceptual framework that I have developed to a 
discussion of two types of reactionary exclusion that have become prevalent in the U.S.: 
religious intolerance toward Muslims and ethnic intolerance toward Mexicans. 
Exclusionary civil, social, and political approaches toward these groups reflect the 
increased importance that nation-states and their members have begun to put on 
citizenship. American ethnocentrists tend to question the validity of Mexican citizenship 
and the quality of Muslim citizenship, denying these groups the important precursor to 
rights and calling identity into question at a highly vulnerable point.  The American 
Constitution and its amendments allocate rights only to citizens; if one can successfully 
argue that certain individuals are lesser citizens, then one can effectively take away any 
number of their fundamental rights. 
 Through my analysis it will become clear that globalization has enhanced ethnic 
and religious intolerance, but I hope to extend my analysis beyond this obvious point to 
show how such forms of intolerance lead toward an escape from politics and away from 
democratic ideals. In the course of my argument I will assert that racism, ethnocentrism, 
and exclusion cannot coexist with the form of freedom that I have endorsed in which 
citizens debate and decide publicly. Policies of exclusion and alienation do not merely 
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impact the peoples at whom these policies are targeted. As I asserted in Chapter Two, 
public freedom is a condition that can only be experienced by a collective group. Because 
exclusionary policies deny equal access to decision-making processes, they threaten those 
conditions of freedom that largely depend upon admission into the public realm, and, 
therefore, their implementation harms everyone in a political community.  
Part I.  Rights and Nationalism: An Exclusionary Odd Couple 
 Rights and nationalism are often considered to contradict, counteract, and even 
work against one another. Rights, which later became a crucial bargaining chip according 
to many social contract theories, were initially intended to protect individuals from 
abuses of power. Nationalism, on the other hand, has always asserted a certain type of 
societal or collective autonomy. Because it has long been assumed that nationalism, 
which tends to benefit established governments, and rights, which tend to benefit 
individual citizens, work against one another, rarely has the relationship been examined 
in sufficient detail. 
 In No Escape: Freedom of Speech and the Paradox of Rights Paul Passavant 
argues that the relationship between liberal rights and nationalism is not an adversarial 
one. As he asserts, “liberalism and nationalism are correlated under ‘modern’ conditions, 
and in fact may function to intensify each other.”96 Elaborating upon this point, he 
explains, “recognizing rights for subjects entails producing subjects for rights.”97 In other 
words, establishing rights for an individual or group necessarily implies determining or 
selecting who will be granted admission into that group. This selection process yields a 
form of collective identity, developed upon those traits that members embody and that 
non-members do not. In this sense, it is not so much that affording legal rights to citizens 
 65 
might enhance nationalistic sentiment, but instead that through their shared dependence 
upon identity, nationalism and liberal rights function cooperatively in distinguishing 
those who belong from those who do not. As Passavant explains, “the conditions of legal 
inclusion,” like those of nationalism, “are, necessarily, exclusive grounds.”98
 Though Passavant’s argument regarding the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between nationalism and rights applies to liberal democracies generally, the relationship 
may be particularly evident in the U.S. In the U.S., the Constitution confers rights upon 
citizens and rights are gained only through citizenship. As Passavant explains, “One’s 
existence as a rights-bearing subject is inextricably linked to one’s national identity.”99 
But what are the important contributing factors to a national identity and how is some 
form of national identity used to establish belonging?  
 Passavant identifies language, territory, and blood as important factors in 
determining national identity; however, he also reinforces my claim from Chapter One 
regarding the significance of the past. As I explained in that chapter, worshipping or 
revering the past—and particularly an imagined past whose characteristics are 
unconfirmed, or even challenged, by historical fact—can have serious implications for 
shaping present-day identity politics. Believing, for instance, that the founders achieved 
an ideal form of governance that can only be destabilized and undermined by change 
leads to highly troubling conclusions when applied and incorporated into a method of 
responding to immigrant and minority communities. Simply put, such an orientation to 
the past enables and even validates exclusion. Passavant echoes this claim:  
Some of the synthetic work of mainstream theory promotes a version of American 
exceptionalism as it invents a phony coherence for the U.S. system by suggesting 
that the framers of the Constitution created a unique system in which rights and 
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the community are in balance and that a return to these principles would solve 
contemporary problems.100 
 
 Passavant’s assessment resembles the diagnosis I offered in Chapter One of the senators 
who questioned Sonia Sotomayor. The assertion that solutions to contemporary problems 
lie in looking backward to our founding moments is commonly presented in the news 
media and in Congress. Such an argument stems from the idea that change will endanger 
the balance struck by our founders and thus undermine our democracy. It is through this 
methodology that the tendency to equate change with loss is developed. 
 The Sotomayor case also illustrated how different notions of “Americanness” 
inform conceptions of national identity. Passavant argues, “there is a gap or play between 
different conceptualizations of what it means to be American.” As he elaborates, “No 
single conceptualization of the American nation could totally control all questions of 
nationality, precisely because the nation is an ‘imagined community’—a construct—
rather than something that really and objectively exists separately from attempts to 
represent it.”101 Envisioned this way, a struggle takes place over national identity that is 
never won or lost but instead persists indefinitely. Within the context of this struggle, 
liberal legal rights are appropriated in the interest of strengthening and reinforcing 
grounds for exclusion. Passavant shows how this is a dangerous trend: “while claims 
regarding American identity enable rights to be recognized, such claims are a source of 
danger from which there is no escape as long as the logic of this system continues to 
operate.”102 
 Passavant describes an enduring struggle that has taken place for some time; 
however, I argue that this struggle is particularly important and contentious today. 
Globalization is widening the gaps between different conceptions of national identity, and 
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it is within these increasingly large gaps that the conditions for rights and citizenship can 
be easily exploited and appropriated for political gain. Later in the chapter I will draw 
upon certain extreme responses that validate this claim. 
Part II. State Supremacy and the Illusion of Absolute Sovereignty  
 Before I move into exclusionary responses to foreigners, we must further dissect 
the origins of these responses. Passavant’s analysis suggests that these responses may be 
an attempt to protect or defend a particular vision of American identity; however, this 
alone does not explain why globalization has produced such an aversion to diversity. 
Building upon Passavant’s contribution, Bonnie Honig argues that exclusionary 
responses are indicative of a more widespread approach to foreigners that considers 
foreignness a “‘problem’ that needs to be solved by way of new knowledge, facts or 
politics.”103 As she accurately points out, “what should ‘we’ do about ‘them’?”104 is a 
question perpetually posed by sociologists, economists, and politicians alike. Rephrasing 
the question, and instead asking, “What problems does foreignness solve for us?” might 
lead us to developing a far more inclusive approach to foreignness.  
 In referring to “we,” Honig implies the existence of a sovereign group or 
collective entity. The common question that she scrutinizes-- “what should we do about 
them?” –asserts a rigid, static, and unchanging collective identity in demarcating “us” 
from “them.” Globalization complicates the process of demarcation, as borders become 
more porous and differences become less defined. As Honig expresses, however, the 
desire to assert an envisioned identity remains fervent. Moreover, the role of the state 
becomes increasingly important, as states must choose how to respond to popular 
tendencies toward a collective identity and away from democratic inclusiveness. 
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 States are concerned about identity because sovereignty, which is the foundational 
principle of the contemporary nation-state, depends upon a coherent sense of identity and 
belonging. As Wendy Brown explains, globalization challenges and undermines absolute 
state sovereignty. In Walled States, Waning Sovereignty Brown defines sovereignty as 
including the following attributes:  
supremacy (no higher power), perpetuity over time (no term limits), decisionism 
(no boundedness by or submission to law), absoluteness and completeness 
(sovereignty cannot be probable or partial), nontransferability (sovereignty cannot 
be conferred without canceling itself), and specified jurisdiction (territoriality).105  
 
Brown contends that nation-state sovereignty “has always been something of a fiction in 
its aspiration and claim to these qualities;” however, she believes globalization is 
exposing this fiction in a particularly glaring way. As she explains, “The monopoly of 
those combined attributes [of sovereignty] has been severely compromised by growing 
transnational flows of capital, people, ideas, goods, violence, and political and religious 
fealty.” (22) In this sense, it is the viability and believability of complete state 
sovereignty—a goal that was never achievable—that is waning. Globalization cannot 
eliminate state sovereignty; however, in challenging certain assertions of absolute 
sovereignty it makes manifest the contradictions between the theoretical inclusiveness of 
liberal democracy and the practical demands of the sovereign nation-state.  
 Brown supports her claim regarding globalization’s challenge to state sovereignty 
by analyzing the construction of walls from a theoretical perspective. As she illustrates, 
the project of walling, when carried out by a democratic regime, is impractical, 
hypocritical, and unethical. Though walls may be constructed for many reasons, Brown 
argues that walls are built as a result of the state’s unease at its decreasing ability to 
exercise complete control. Walls might be viewed not as solutions to contemporary 
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problems but instead as vestiges of state power. “Rather than resurgent expressions of 
nation-state sovereignty, the new walls are icons of its erosion,” asserts Brown; “they 
reveal a tremulousness, vulnerability, dubiousness, or instability at the core of what they 
aim to express.”106 As Brown reveals, in constructing walls, states reveal their uneasiness 
at the “ungovernability by law and politics of many powers unleashed by 
globalization.”107 But are the walls a logical response to such fears? And what are the 
repercussions of walling? 
 In the age of globalization, walls cannot physically satisfy their aim to keep 
everything out. As Brown explains, “walls often function theatrically, projecting power 
and efficaciousness that they do not and cannot actually exercise and that they also 
performatively contradict.”108 Paradoxically, these costly walls do not actually achieve 
their putative goals, yet they do serve another function. In putting a wall around a society, 
the state performs a kind of “staged sovereignty,” suggesting that it maintains protective 
powers that are in fact “radically limited by modern technologies and paths of 
infiltration.”109 This projection of power may be blatantly misleading, but it responds to a 
human desire; walls provide a “reassuring world picture.”110 Furthermore, as Brown 
points out “The popular desire for walling harbors a wish for powers of protection, 
containment, and integration promised by sovereignty.”111 Thus, while the walls may be 
impractical, nation-states likely look to achieve more in the process of building the wall 
than just a practical, physical objective. Specifically, these walls constitute a reassuring 
response to constituent concerns about foreignness and diminishing state sovereignty. 
 Many suggest that walls are irrelevant, for while they are costly and impractical, 
they provide empty reassurance to an anxious public. And if inefficiency and cost were 
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the lone setbacks of walling, we may even be able to accept the practice on a theoretical 
level. However, Brown points out that walling is not merely inefficient or impractical; 
walls are inherently violent structures that harm and endanger the underpinnings of the 
political society they seek to enclose. We must consider the paradox of putting a wall 
around a democratic country, whose political ethos is one of inclusion, acceptance, and 
equality. Brown captures this paradox well in arguing that walls undermine democracy: 
Like the Berlin Wall, contemporary walls, especially those around democracies, 
often undo or invert the contrasts they are meant to inscribe. Officially aimed at 
protecting putatively free, open, lawful, and secular societies from trespass, 
exploitation, or attack, the walls are built of suspended law and inadvertently 
produce a collective ethos and subjectivity that is defensive, parochial, 
nationalistic, and militarized. They generate an increasingly closed and policed 
collective identity in place of the open society they would defend. Thus, the new 
walls are not merely ineffective in resurrecting the eroding nation-state 
sovereignty to which they respond, but they contribute new forms of xenophobia 
and parochialism to a postnational era.112  
 
Seen through this lens, walls are outdated not only in their ineffectiveness but also in the 
political principles they reflect. Walls assert a form of absolute state sovereignty that 
cannot be preserved in the face of globalization. Yet walls should be seen as just one 
manifestation, one symptom, of exclusionary responses to globalization. While the 
physical effect of walling will be explored later with regards to the U.S.-Mexico border 
wall, on a metaphorical level, the tendency to build walls reveals a discomfort with 
globalization so pervasive that it yields a willingness to neglect fundamental freedom-
enabling principles in order to reassert control. Citizens and governments have become so 
fearful of diminishing sovereignty that they have adopted methods of physically 
enforcing national identity that contradict and undermine the fundamental principles of 
the societal structures they seek to protect. Contemporary walling is a futile exercise, but 
it is the byproduct of a confrontation between the nation-state’s yearning for complete 
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state sovereignty and the realities of globalization. My goal of this chapter is not to 
overcome this deeply rooted conflict but instead to recognize it, emphasize its existence, 
and show how conceptions of freedom based upon sovereignty do not assist us in 
functionally addressing and responding to it. Moreover, while sovereignty leads us astray 
in responding to globalization, substantive freedom embraces diversity as part of an 
increasingly contested political landscape, facilitating an inclusive response to new 
challenges instead of an escape from politics altogether.  
Part III.  Two Types of Sovereignty, Two Types of Exclusion 
 As I have argued so far, national identity, whether based upon access to certain 
rights or acceptance within a “sovereign” collective, determines belonging as it pertains 
to the nation-state. In developing a coherent national identity, the citizens and the state 
often function cooperatively, extending their shared belief in the nation’s exceptionalism. 
Arjun Appadurai elaborates upon this shared sense of identity in Fear of Small Numbers. 
He argues that the very idea behind the modern nation-state is dangerous, relying on the 
preservation of a national identity or “national ethnos” that implies some form of “ethnic 
genius.”113 Globalization, he argues, has not only challenged the underlying assumptions 
of the nation-state, but it has also undermined ethnos-based responses to perceived 
threats. As Appadurai explains, eliminating and accentuating differences has become 
impossible in the age of “high globalization”: “The brutality, degradation, and 
dehumanization that have frequently accompanied the ethnicized violence of the past 
fifteen years are a sign of conditions in which the very line between minor and major 
differences has been made uncertain.”114 Globalization has exposed the fictional idea 
behind the modern nation-state; however, this does not mean that proponents of this 
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“national ethnos” have conceded. Instead, they have initiated a struggle over the future of 
the nation-state, launching a violent and desperate campaign with the goal of reasserting 
the demarcated boundaries that the nation-state’s survival requires.  
 This campaign can be seen in two arenas, both in the U.S. and in parts of Western 
Europe. Brown argues that sovereignty, though waning, “[appears] today in two domains 
of power…political economy and religiously legitimated political violence.”115 In the 
remainder of the chapter I will assess how the United States has responded to challenges 
related to global capital and religious violence, and in doing so will validate Brown’s 
claim. Specifically, I will consider political and civil policies toward Mexicans and 
Muslims and the ways in which both groups have been increasingly targeted as 
embodiments of American fears of change and loss. U.S. dependence upon migrant 
workers from Mexico exposes absolute sovereignty as an illusion, while Muslim 
Americans challenge a widespread identity-based conception of America as a cohesive 
Christian nation. Exclusionary policies toward both groups seek to deny the realities of 
globalization and turn back the hands of time by nostalgically reasserting a mythical 
national identity. In both cases, the policies that I will target seek to limit the access of 
these groups to political processes, thus undermining conditions of substantive freedom 
while inhibiting the political rights of those who embody the perceived threat of 
foreignness. 
“Reasonable Suspicion:” Arizona’s New Measuring Stick 
 
 Border security and immigration policy have been a source of increasing political 
attention in the U.S. over the last couple of decades, but little progress has been made 
with regard to refining or strengthening U.S. immigration policies. The demand for 
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greater enforcement of immigration laws is not new; however, such demands have rarely, 
if ever, prompted the development of logical and realistic policy recommendations. In 
Wendy Brown’s exposé on walling she discusses the wall-building project along the 
U.S.-Mexico border and explains why it might be considered one of the least effective 
methods of curtailing immigration. The project, she argues, was “born out of a tension 
between the needs of North American capital and popular antagonism toward the 
migration incited by those needs, especially their effect on wages, employment, and the 
demographics and cultures composing and in some eyes decomposing the nation.”116 As 
she explains, the paradox of the U.S.-Mexico border wall is that the U.S. is dependent 
upon the cheap labor that it “purports to lock out.”117 The wall serves to highlight the 
irony of placing walls around democracies and makes painfully evident the fiction of 
absolute state sovereignty.  As Brown asserts,  
The U.S.-Mexico barrier stages a sovereign power and control that it does not 
exercise, is built from the fabric of a suspended rule of law and fiscal 
nonaccountability, has multiplied and intensified criminal industries, and is an 
icon of the combination of sovereign erosion and heightened xenophobia and 
nationalism increasingly prevalent in Western democracies today.”118   
 
 Like most contemporary walls, the U.S.-Mexico border wall has proven 
ineffective at keeping people and things out, namely immigrants in this case. By most 
accounts, immigrants have merely been rerouted, not deterred, and the rate of migrant 
deaths has increased. Moreover, many argue that physical impediments like the wall 
provide an incentive for immigrants to remain permanently in the U.S. once they have 
successfully entered the country. Because the wall and other approaches have so clearly 
failed, new methods have been adopted to curtail immigration. 
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 In April 2010 the Arizona state legislature developed a new law in hopes of 
cutting the number of Mexican immigrants entering and residing in the U.S. The Support 
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (Arizona SB 1070), which was due 
to take effect in July but has since been challenged in federal courts, would put state law 
enforcement officials in the position of cracking down on illegal immigration, a task 
usually left to federal authorities. The law states the following:  
For any lawful contact made by a law enforcement official or agency of this state 
or a county, city, town, or other political subdivision of this state where 
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in 
the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to 
determine the immigration status of the person.119  
 
The “reasonable suspicion” clause is arguably the most controversial portion of the bill, 
as it confers upon law enforcement officials the legal obligation to act on their suspicions, 
regardless of what the source of those suspicions may be. Enforcement of the law 
requires that law enforcement officials develop, either consciously or subconsciously, 
some concept of what an “alien” looks like. In this sense, national identity, and 
specifically individual law enforcement officers’ notions of American identity, is not only 
incorporated in legal language, but becomes central to the effective enforcement of the 
law. 
 The Arizona law targets citizenship both as a way of legalizing identity-based 
exclusion and as a method of striking fear into the minds of immigrants. Because 
individual conceptions of national identity are translated into law enforcement practices, 
“reasonably suspected” persons are thus at the mercy of any such conceptions. For an 
immigrant, the difference between two law enforcement officials’ notions of what an 
American looks like could mean the difference between remaining in the U.S. and being 
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deported. Moreover, because the law further stipulates that all “reasonably suspected” 
persons must possess documentation proving their citizenship or risk monetary and legal 
punishment, even citizens who appear “foreign” become reliant upon police officers’ 
conceptions of national identity in order to enjoy the full rights of citizens. Passavant’s 
correlation between rights and identity is made manifest in the Arizona law, as the 
protection of rights for certain individuals depends largely on those individuals’ 
compatibility with a certain conception of national identity.  
 Besides its institutionalization of certain conceptions of American identity, the 
law also has the potential to transform the relationship between civilians and the police 
by greatly expanding discretionary policing powers. President Obama warned in his 
initial statement following the enactment of the bill that it threatened “to undermine the 
trust between police and our communities that is so crucial to keeping us safe.”120 The 
law creates an atmosphere of antagonism and distrust between citizens and law 
enforcement officials; however, the majority of Americans support the law.121 Might it be 
that Americans feel reassured by the Arizona law which, like past discriminatory laws 
such as the Patriot Act, serves to reassert state sovereignty? Claims of state sovereignty 
are undermined by American dependence on low wage labor; however, the Arizona law 
denies this dependency, instead reaffirming American independence and exceptionalism. 
Religious Intolerance: Blaming Muslim Americans for 9/11  
 Discriminatory practices against Muslim Americans in many ways follow the 
xenophobic example of Arizona’s immigration policy; however, there are important 
differences that have made the domestic fight against Islam more overtly violent and 
hateful in recent years than that against immigration. The struggle against illegal 
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immigration takes place in a clearly demarcated zone, where physical barriers can be 
erected as symbols of state sovereignty. Furthermore, immigrant rights can easily be 
taken away or threatened under the pretense that citizenship is required for basic rights. 
Above all, in the case of immigration, it seems clear where the perceived “threat” is 
coming from. None of these features exist in the civilian-led fight against Islam. Anti-
Muslim sentiment derives loosely from the events of September 11, 2001, but the 
connection between Islam, a religion practiced by millions, and Al Qaeda, the terrorist 
group responsible for the attacks, is tenuous. The complexities of this relationship are 
well beyond the scope of this chapter; however, the difficulty of identifying the real and 
viable threat of terrorist acts initiated by Islamic fundamentalists is important to mention. 
Specifically, the fluidity of the threat from Al Qaeda and other non-state actors poses a 
challenge of identification that nation-states have so far proven unable to meet.  
 Civilian responses to the attacks on 9/11 have reflected a widespread fear of 
American identity loss. While the federal government has initiated foreign wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, civilians’ domestic responses to Islam have suggested that there 
exists a perceived threat within American borders. Nearly ten years removed from the 
attacks, the fear, anger, and bitter hatred that the event provoked in many Americans is 
still evident, and it is often displaced upon Muslim Americans. Because of the difficulty 
of adequately identifying the non-traditional enemy or effectively asserting state 
sovereignty, blaming Muslim Americans has seemingly become a default response. 
Through subjugating an identifiable religious minority group, average citizens have 
attempted to reassert their conception of American identity.   
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 One manifestation of frustration and fear displaced upon Muslim Americans 
recently appeared in Murfreesboro, Tennessee where for more than a year a battle has 
been waged over the expansion of a Muslim Community Center. A similar project in 
New York City has received widespread attention; however, the ongoing debacle in 
Tennessee may better encapsulate the current state of American Islamophobia.  
 In November 2009 a Muslim congregation bought a new space, as its old one had 
become too small. What seemed like a benign expansion project to build a community 
center and mosque soon became a battle over religious freedom when two months later 
the site was vandalized. In August 2010 construction equipment was set on fire and 
gunshots were fired nearby the site, prompting many church members to stay home 
instead of attending routine services. Throughout the summer, opponents of the project 
protested nearby the site, while one local Republican congressman accused the Islamic 
center of training terrorists.122 
 The drama took a strange turn in September 2010 when three residents of 
Rutherford County filed a lawsuit. In the lawsuit, the residents contended that they “have 
been and will be irreparably harmed by the risk of terrorism generated by proselytising 
for Islam and inciting the practices of sharia law.” They further claimed that sharia 
“advocates sexual abuse of children, beating and physical abuse of women, death edicts, 
honour killings, killing of homosexuals, outright lies to Kafirs (those who don’t submit to 
sharia law), Constitution-free zones, and total world dominion.”123 The Economist 
mocked the lawsuit in its November 2010 article on the subject, pointing out that 
“Murfreesboro has had a mosque for decades, and does not seem infested with 
‘Constitution-free zones.’”124 Nonetheless, the myths that protestors have chosen to 
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believe reveal an overheated and anxious public looking to displace its frustrations on the 
nearest target.  
 The plaintiffs’ approach of seeking legal recourse to block the project is important 
to consider in light of our earlier discussion regarding the link between rights and 
national identity. In arguing that they were adversely impacted by the prospect of the 
Muslim community center, the plaintiffs challenged and called into question whether 
Muslim Americans should be afforded the same rights as other citizens. By putting the 
court in the position of arbitrating between competing rights claims, they hoped the court 
would deny freedom of religion in favor of appeasing their seemingly irrational fears. In 
invoking laws to undermine the project, these individuals did exactly what Passavant 
describes, using rights as a means of enforcing a particular conception of American 
identity. 
 Attempts to link the mosque to terrorist organizations revealed the intensity of 
residual frustrations of American citizens. Unable to enact revenge upon legitimate 
targets, citizens have instead chosen places like Murfreesboro to fight back. As the limits 
of state sovereignty become increasingly obvious, these types of responses to foreignness 
should be expected; however, attempts to exclude these groups may serve to magnify the 
very threat that they struggle to identify and respond to.  
 If the Islamophobic campaigns we have recently witnessed in Murfreesboro and 
New York City become a trend, it will be important for legal and social institutions to 
stand their ground. Rights-based attempts to exclude Muslim Americans, if entertained, 
will further institutionalize intolerance and exclusion. For the purposes of my discussion, 
protecting certain individuals’ rights to the preclusion of others would reward civilian 
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attempts to escape an increasingly diverse political environment and thus divert 
Americans further away from substantive freedom.  
∗ ∗ ∗ 
 The challenges posed by globalization are unlikely to disappear in the near future. 
As borders continue to weaken and domestic economies become increasingly 
interdependent and global, the U.S. must make choices as to how it will respond. Will 
perceived outsiders continue to be excluded to the detriment of democracy and, 
potentially, at the risk of increasing America’s likelihood of being targeted for terrorism? 
Or will the limits of the state be recognized and accepted as a sign that a long-term shift, 
in both our political and social approach, is in order? Embracing the conception of 
freedom that I have endorsed throughout the preceding chapters would lead us to 
abandon the nation-state discourse of superiority and exclusivity, instead reestablishing 
our devotion to democracy’s inclusiveness. In the age of globalization rights are still 
important, but our conception of freedom must expand upon this minimalist framework. 
Only through enabling diverse and widespread involvement in political decision-making 
can we establish a response to globalization that revitalizes democracy, even in the face 
of the unique and complex forces that challenge it. 
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Chapter IV. Freedom and Stability 
 
“By teaching us to associate phenomena such as regularity and continuity with 
hierarchical relations of command and obedience, the idea of rule can encourage the sort 
of withdrawal from practical engagement that is required to maintain the illusion of 
mastery.”125 
 –Patchen Markell 
 
 
 In the first three chapters I adopted a fairly critical stance toward the state. In the 
first chapter I condemned the state for limiting freedom under the guise of ensuring 
political stability. I questioned the concept of entrusting representative bodies with the 
task of ascertaining a “public” or “collective interest” and subsequently authorizing them 
to defend this interest. I argued that some rights are often conferred and protected by 
states in exchange for citizens’ voluntary forfeiture of other rights as a means of 
paradoxically limiting substantive freedom for citizens. In the second chapter I illustrated 
the limits of the state in mediating between competing rights claims. I asserted that the 
individualist nature of rights contradicts a far more collective reality in which all kinds of 
individual acts influence one another and determine the conditions within which others 
act. I highlighted the inadequacy of the law, as an extension of the state, in solving 
enduring problems regarding responsibility, specifically in cases of violent or hateful 
speech. In the third chapter I revealed the state as a reflection of the people and their 
anxieties in response to globalization. I considered the ways in which rights can be 
appropriated in the interest of demarcating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and 
interrogated the notion of all-encompassing state sovereignty. Here I criticized the state 
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for feeding off of and reinforcing citizens’ fears of foreignness and for responding in 
ways that threaten conditions of freedom.  
 My indictments of organized governance in the previous chapters may appear to 
champion unlimited citizen freedoms in place of a centralized state. My criticism of the 
state in these chapters as often times dishonest, hypocritical, inept, and insecure could be 
construed as leading down a path toward lawlessness and anarchy. But in this chapter I 
will preemptively respond to criticism that my theory of freedom tends toward anarchy. 
Although government is typically conceived of as a source of stability that necessarily 
limits freedom, the relationship between freedom and governance need not be an 
adversarial one. The oft-presented choice between freedom and stability, instability and 
organized governance, is a false one whose persistent strangle hold on political thought is 
itself a very real and daunting challenge to substantive freedom. Freedom is not 
challenged by conditions of stability; freedom is undercut by the false choice presented 
by what Patchen Markell terms an “oppositional matrix”126 between freedom and 
governance, and by the foundational idea that governance necessarily constitutes rule.  
 In this chapter I will not present a merit-based defense of the state nor will I 
rescind my previous condemnations. I will instead argue that despite the many ways in 
which the state serves to inhibit the exercise of freedom, my vision for freedom is 
actually contingent upon stable governance. Government is undoubtedly part of “the 
problem,” but is also the very basis of the only possible solution. In order to clarify and 
substantiate this conclusion I will need to scrutinize and ultimately discredit the 
classically conceived oppositional relationship between freedom and stable governance.  
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 Importantly, all of my prior criticisms of the state have revealed the extent to 
which states rely upon the freedom vs. stability dichotomy. Madison warned in Federalist 
10 that without organized government to protect property and individual rights, chaos 
would ensue and rights would be undermined. Similarly, in responding to globalization, 
elected officials have repeatedly warned that laissez-faire policies toward immigrant 
communities and minority groups would be destabilizing and could threaten democratic 
foundations. As Patchen Markell asserts, governmental institutions “are properly objects 
of democratic criticism not because they produce order and stability but…just insofar as 
they predicate the order and stability they produce on the narrowing of some or all 
citizens’ practical horizons.”127 Thus, when states present themselves as stabilizing forces 
in order to increase their authority and limit that of the people they govern, they tend to 
reinforce the notion that freedom defies and challenges established conditions of stability. 
 By interrogating the traditional correlations between governance and stability, 
freedom and destabilization, I will be able to stress the need for organized governance 
without rescinding my previous critiques of state assertions of power. My analysis will 
rely heavily upon Arendt’s distinction, drawn out by Patchen Markell, between 
governance and rule. Arendt and Markell indirectly argue that correlating governance and 
rule facilitates a subsequent correlation between rule and stability. Importantly, freedom 
inherently opposes the concept of rule, though not that of stable governance.  
 I will consult Arendt, as well as Beauvoir, in asserting that freedom’s potential 
compatibility with conditions of stability does not mean that free acts can be predicted or 
foreseen. Both theorists contend forcefully that free acts are merely a point of departure, 
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and that all acts are partially unknowing. This claim will reinforce the argument I made in 
the second chapter, as the impact of free acts upon others will need to be revisited. 
 Finally, I will examine the Tea Party Movement as a prime example of a group 
whose ideological bent reflects its acceptance of the false choice between organized 
governance and freedom. Self-proclaimed advocates of individual freedom, Tea Party 
members are perpetually deriding government for overstepping its bounds and limiting 
their rights. Interestingly, the individuals whom they admire and revere—such as Thomas 
Jefferson, James Madison, and Thomas Paine—are the very founders whom I criticized 
in Chapter One for deceiving the citizenry into forfeiting its political agency. As the 
complexity, hypocrisy, and incoherence of this Tea Party contradiction could make our 
heads spin, I will again consult Jill Lepore and Jason Frank in the hopes that their insights 
will shed light upon this purportedly revolutionary movement. I will argue that the Tea 
Party’s antipathy toward government is misplaced, reckless, and exceedingly dangerous. 
Its lack of clarity as to the content of freedom and the ends of government has led the 
movement in a perilous direction. Its threats of violence and revolution must not be 
mislabeled as among those activities which Frank would consider “constituent moments.” 
By relying on the notion that government threatens freedom, the Tea Party is not 
reclaiming political agency from elected representatives on behalf of underrepresented 
groups, but is instead revealing itself as an exploited and easily appropriated force whose 
right-wing corporate puppet-masters have coerced its frustrated members into 
antagonizing blameless individuals. 
 Ultimately, I will argue in this chapter that freedom is inherently unstable, but not 
necessarily destabilizing. My goals in this chapter are twofold: to disassociate freedom 
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and revolution by asserting that exercises of freedom do not inherently defy an 
established order; and to expose the false sense of stability upon which freedom-
inhibiting institutions precariously rely. My conception of freedom challenges many of 
those presented by constitutionalists as well as anarchists but it should not be 
misconstrued as a call to arms. I will seek to develop in this chapter the potential for a 
relationship of mutual dependence and reinforcement between my conception of freedom 
and certain forms of organized governance. 
Part I.  Illusive Stability and the Monopoly of Rule 
 Many democratic theorists have addressed the seeming antagonism between 
freedom and governance over the last few decades amid their attempts to rationalize the 
organization and institutionalization of a form of government—democracy—that 
inherently tends toward disorder and shapelessness. In his essay on the 
“constitutionalizing” of democracy, Sheldon Wolin suggests that the evolving 
relationship between democracies and constitutions has pulled democracy away from its 
revolutionary origins.128 Wolin views constitutions as mechanisms of institutionalization 
that initiate a tendency toward procedures, process, routinization, and ritualization and 
away from spontaneity in decision-making, which he identifies as an integral foundation 
of democracy.129 As Wolin asserts, “[institutionalization] tends to produce internal 
hierarchies, to restrict experience, to associate political experience with institutional 
experience, and to inject an esoteric element into politics.”130 For Wolin, the 
“diametrically opposed”131 forces of revolution and constitutionalism tug at the heart of 
democracy, and he is concerned that constitutionalism is winning out. Wolin worries that 
the spontaneous spirit of democracy may be lost if actual democracies continue to 
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embrace the order and stability that constitutions provide and reject the impulsiveness 
that may have motivated democratic development in the first place. 
 Encouraging a shift away from constitutionalism, Wolin proposes instead a 
democracy based upon his concept of “rational disorganization:”132 “I propose accepting 
the familiar charges that democracy is inherently unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and 
identified with revolution,” asserts Wolin, “and using these traits as a basis for a 
different, aconstitutional conception of democracy.”133 Wolin’s critique of the influence 
of constitutionalism in mutating and ultimately reshaping democracy is an apt one and 
one that I partially echoed in the first chapter, but his proposed alternative of adopting a 
system of “rational disorganization” is exceedingly vague. A society based upon such a 
principle might be perfectly democratic in some idealized sense, but its implications for 
freedom may well be far too complex for us to predict. While I have been critical of 
certain forms of state influence, I have conceded that the state is crucially important in 
certain circumstances in enabling freedom for citizens. Wolin’s rejection of the prospects 
of organized governance altogether seems reckless. Moreover, he accepts what I deem a 
false choice between organization and anarchy, endorsing the latter as a result of his 
comparative assessments of revolution and governance through the traditional binary 
lens.  
 Breaking from Wolin and others, I argue that one does not have to abandon 
organized governance in order to enable and encourage conditions conducive to freedom. 
Not all of the characteristics that Wolin identified as inherent to institutionalization are 
necessarily inherent to governance. Despite insinuating the contrary, Wolin describes just 
one form of governmental organization, namely that which relies upon subordination and 
 86 
the establishment of hierarchies; this is not the only way in which individuals can 
organize. 
 In The Human Condition Hannah Arendt interrogates the likening of organization 
to hierarchy. She argues that rule is developed upon a fictitious notion “that men can 
lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and others 
are forced to obey.”134 As she explains, the assumption that rule is the lone alternative to 
anarchy derives from the theories of individuals as old as Plato and Aristotle, who, in 
order to “find a substitute for action,” determined that “every political community 
consists of those who rule and those who are ruled.”135 Importantly, these theorists did 
not intend to organize or control politics but were instead seeking an escape from politics 
altogether, “from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet and order.”136 It 
was in the interest of this goal that Plato developed a distinction between “those who 
know and do not act and those who act and do not know.”137 Seeking stability, Plato and 
Aristotle arrived upon rule as a means of avoiding and alleviating the complexities and 
challenges of political life. It seemed that rule would provide conditions of relative safety 
and security in comparison to other options; however, Arendt suggests that rule is not the 
only means of organizing and governing a people. 
 While the model developed by Plato and Aristotle has provided the appearance of 
an escape from the instability and uneasiness that political life provides, it is essential to 
assert that this is but one method of political stabilization. As Patchen Markell explains, 
rule is based upon conceit:  “the fact that structures of subordination often do produce 
more or less stable orders does not mean that they are the only forms of human 
relationship that can do so, nor does it mean that their strategies for ensuring stability are 
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sustainable.”138 Markell makes two crucial points here relating to the illusiveness and 
deceptiveness of rule. First, while rule often coexists with conditions of stability one 
cannot extrapolate from this correlation that one causes the other or that rule is the only 
form of organization compatible with stability. Put another way, the common inclination 
to equate rule with stability is based upon the establishment of an unsubstantiated (and 
impossible to substantiate) causality between subordination and stability. Secondly, the 
underpinnings of ostensibly stable structures may be far more fragile than they appear. 
Governments that oppress and subordinate tend to seem very much in control, but their 
power ultimately resides with the people they oppress and the extent to which those 
individuals’ fears of disorder will continue to outweigh their desires for liberation. 
 Markell’s second claim regarding the sustainability of stability deserves further 
scrutiny, as I believe we must separate rule from stability in order to accomplish our 
larger goal of distinguishing rule from other forms of governance. Stability props up and 
fortifies rule and its foundational assumptions, including the premise that some 
individuals must sacrifice freedoms in the interest of preserving safety and security. By 
claiming a monopoly on conditions of stability, proponents of rule suggest that freedom 
and stability cannot coexist. But Markell’s claim suggests that rule projects a sense of 
stability that it cannot provide and relies on its image as a provider of stability in order to 
maintain and reinforce existing hierarchical structures. The claim of rule, namely that 
future destabilizing events can be predicted and prevented, is the illusion of rule that 
ascribes anarchic qualities to freedom so as to dissuade free action. 
 Rule’s promise of stability derives from the past but is oriented toward the future, 
reflecting not only an intent to preserve a condition that ostensibly already exists, but, 
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more importantly, implying an ability to actually control whether or not the promise can 
be fulfilled. The inclination of people toward rule may reflect a relative discomfort with 
newness. In the wake of World War II, Arendt wrote extensively about totalitarianism 
and denounced the tendency to conflate totalitarianism with other more recognizable 
forms of authoritarian government. By equating “totalitarian government with some well-
known evil of the past,”139 individuals were better able to cope in the wake of 
totalitarianism, and could more easily reconcile the emergence of totalitarianism with 
their preconceptions about the world. But as Arendt argues, such an approach is an 
escape from true understanding, developed from the sense that “we have inherited the 
wisdom of the past to guide us through [evil].”140  
 In Arendt’s essays she argues forcefully that past events cannot present accurate 
predictions for the future. Moreover, when an event takes place, “everything changes,”141 
and we can never be fully prepared for this change. As she explains, “Just as in our 
personal lives our worst fears and best hopes will never adequately prepare us for what 
actually happens…so each event in human history reveals an unexpected landscape of 
human deeds, sufferings, and new possibilities which together transcend the sum total of 
all willed intentions and the significance of all origins.”142Arendt’s claim is crucial to our 
consideration of the promise of stability. Claims to stability rely on a belief that 
prediction is possible, but Arendt’s notion of beginning challenges this belief, instead 
suggesting that sustained stability can never be ensured. The inclination to look to past 
events in interpreting and responding to present challenges, as I argued in Chapter One, 
constitutes a futile attempt to make sense of changes that seem overwhelming or 
disconcerting. Not only do such interpretations undermine our ability to pursue freedom, 
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but they concurrently lead us astray in attempting to become more knowledgeable 
through engagement with the world. 
 Arendt offers extensive insights into the unpredictability of events, but Markell 
and Beauvoir are particularly useful in elaborating upon the inconsistent realities of the 
human condition. As Markell asserts,  “To say that all events exhibit unexpectedness…is 
to say that no degree of certainty about whether something will or will not happen, and 
what it will turn out to be, can smooth over the difference between ‘not yet’ and 
‘already’”143 Yet stability aims to do exactly what Markell claims is impossible—to 
“smooth over” this difference through ensuring certain future results. So why do people 
tend toward rule? 
 Arendt has suggested that people are uncomfortable with not knowing, but 
Beauvoir offers a more comprehensive assessment of the human condition in The Ethics 
of Ambiguity. In her critical work Beauvoir forcibly opens the reader’s eyes to an 
ambiguous and unstable human condition that is both empowering and terrifying. She 
asserts that individuals exercise real control over their lives with limited influence from 
larger forces; however, she explores man’s reluctance to seize his potential agency and 
resultant inability to understand his condition. Even if promises of stability can never be 
guaranteed, individuals are easily enticed by such promises because they are uneasy 
about the openness and uncertainty of a world that is almost fully in their hands. As 
Beauvoir explains, “Men do not like to feel themselves in danger. Yet, it is because there 
are real dangers, real failures, and real earthly damnation that words like victory, wisdom, 
or joy have meaning. Nothing is decided in advance, and it is because man has something 
to lose and because he can lose that he can also win.”144 In this passage Beauvoir asserts 
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the agency of man, but she also introduces a level of control that is frightening to many. 
Stability provides a sense of complete reassurance and safety, whereas freedom does not. 
As Beauvoir explains, embracing freedom entails exposing oneself to the realities of an 
interconnected and ever-changing world.145 We tend to forfeit the choice of freedom 
voluntarily and submit to rule, for choosing freedom is so difficult and uncomfortable 
that perceived conditions of predictability and continuity seem preferable. 
Part II. Freedom: A Coherent Alternative to Rule 
 Arendt, Markell, Beauvoir, and I are all interested in an alternative to rule that 
might better enable the pursuit of freedom. So far I have aimed to demonstrate how rule 
is not our only choice in embracing governance and rejecting anarchy. I have also 
considered how expectations for the future can serve to challenge and undermine 
freedom, implying that claims to unconditional stability detract from our ability to 
experience freedom. Yet, having exposed rule’s inability to ensure stability, we must now 
consider whether or not freedom can provide any form of stability at all. Rule’s promise 
of stability and the expectations it induces have encouraged theories of freedom to be 
deemed destabilizing. For example, Arendt’s notion of “beginning,” a crucial component 
of her definition of a free act, has been misconstrued by many as inciting revolution 
because of its seeming break from the flow of time. However, while Arendt has 
suggested that certain historical revolutions have met the criteria by which she defines 
free acts, it would be a grave error to assume that she would consider only those acts that 
defy an established order “free.” I will explain in this section how Arendt’s conception of 
freedom is potentially compatible with certain forms of governance. I will argue that her 
focus on beginning and newness does not reflect an obsession with revolution but instead 
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an honest assessment regarding the limits of governance and the conditions of stability 
that it seeks to provide. I will argue that foreclosing the possibility of complete stability 
does not mean that some form of stability is not possible. Moreover, I will illustrate how 
some form of governance may actually be required in order to give free acts some 
contextual meaning. 
 In replacing rule with a form of organized governance that enables freedom, it 
must be conceded that this new form can provide only a modest form of stability (modest 
insofar as it can claim only not to encourage revolution, but cannot claim to actively 
discourage it) and that one cannot retrieve the same feeling of stability that rule provides. 
However, it will become clear that freedom does not inherently challenge stability, but 
instead demarcates the outer limits of stability and serves to make manifest the reality 
that almost nothing can be predicted or foreseen.  
 In order to better articulate the prospective relationship between governance and 
freedom, we must return to Markell’s and Arendt’s critiques of rule. In Markell’s essay 
he asserts, “the paradox that democratic theorists have identified in the relationship 
between democracy and rule may best be understood neither as a problem to be solved 
nor as a limitation to be accepted, but rather as a symptom of the ongoing dominance of 
political theory and practice by the idea of rule.”146 In order to overcome the dominance 
of rule, it is essential to abandon the rule-anarchy dichotomy, as neither can provide 
conditions of substantive freedom. 
 It is significant that Markell’s indictment of rule is non-discriminating in that it 
targets both rule’s proponents and critics fairly equally. As we have examined so far, 
proponents of rule rely upon a common inclination to equate rule with stability; however, 
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most opponents of rule tend to accept this likening of rule to governance as well, 
proposing some form of “controlled” anarchy as an alternative. Markell clarifies in his 
reading of Arendt that Arendt criticizes rule “not to celebrate those phenomena that are 
conventionally taken to be rule’s opposites, such as disorder, instability, interruptions of 
regularity, or radical breaks in continuity, but to prise apart phenomena that the idea of 
‘rule’ has taught us to see as inseparably connected.”147 Through making this point 
Markell distinguishes Arendt from Wolin and others whose criticisms of rule ultimately 
yield an acceptance of anarchy as the preferable alternative. Wolin’s framework, like that 
of proponents of rule, leaves us with only two choices, neither of which is favorable to 
my conceptualization of freedom. Accepting rule entails sacrificing certain freedoms in 
favor of reassurance and security, while embracing conditions of anarchy may translate 
into a higher level of individual freedom (conceived narrowly in this case as autonomy or 
independence), but produces countless consequences as well. Arendt’s rejection of 
Wolin’s binary framework enables the possibility of another option. 
 Unlike Wolin’s critique of rule, Arendt’s criticism allows for the subsequent 
assertion that governance may in some cases enable the exercise of freedom. In reading 
Arendt, Alan Keenan writes that Arendt understands freedom’s need for “the support of 
political foundations in order to become more than an occasional or marginal 
occurrence.”148 In this passage Keenan suggests that conditions of perpetual anarchy 
would undermine freedom. While anarchy allows for unlimited autonomy, it is likely to 
also result in the loss of those contexts in which free acts have actual meaning. 
 In order to understand Keenan’s point, let us return to my discussion of Arendt in 
Chapter Two, in which I related Arendt’s vision for free acts as forms of engagement 
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with the world and with others. For Arendt, free acts constitute a type of beginning, but 
not in its traditional sense. As Markell explains, Arendt’s notion of beginning “picks out 
not the spontaneous patterns, but the sense in which action, whether disruptive or not, 
involves attention and responsiveness to worldly events.” Markell’s assessment of 
beginning is crucially important as it provides a criterion by which to determine whether 
or not an act is a free one; namely whether or not the act engages and responds to the 
world. Describing an act as one of beginning does not express the extent to which the act 
is defiant or even spontaneous, but instead reflects whether or not the act in question 
engages the world. In order for these kinds of free acts to be possible, and thus to have 
meaning, it would seem that some form of organization may be necessary. As Markell 
claims, freedom is threatened not by the “enforcement of regularity, but [by] the erosion 
of contexts in which events call for responses, and, thus, in which it makes sense to act at 
all.”149 Just as rule threatens freedom, conditions of anarchy similarly undermine freedom 
by stripping potentially free acts of their contextual meaning. Without any organization, 
the desire, and in some cases need, to act freely in response to others, could dissolve. 
Neither anarchy nor rule enable freedom in the way that we have conceived of it, and in 
many cases both choices may actively threaten and limit the possibility of freedom. 
 In my readings of Wolin, Markell, Arendt, and Beauvoir I have exposed the 
choice between governance and freedom as a false one. I have sought to lay the 
groundwork for a conception of freedom that functions in accordance with governance, 
but that also defies many of the ideas that we traditionally associate with rule, such as a 
particular form of hierarchical stability. Through providing the potential for freedom to 
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coexist with governance, I hope to enable a form of freedom that retains its contextual 
meaning while existing outside of hierarchical limitations. 
Part III.  The Tea Party: A Revolution? 
“[The bombers] took to the ultimate extreme an idea advocated in the months and years 
before the bombing by an increasingly vocal minority: the belief that the greatest threat to 
American freedom is our government, and that public servants do not protect our 
freedoms, but abuse them…Our founders constructed a system of government so that 
reason could prevail over fear. Oklahoma City proved once again that without the law 
there is no freedom.”150 –Bill Clinton 
 
 In order to substantiate my claim that the classically conceived antagonism 
between freedom and governance serves to undermine freedom in identifiable ways, I 
will turn now to a contemporary manifestation of this antagonism—the Tea Party—and 
assert its consequences for freedom. The Tea Party, which has been praised by those on 
the right for its mobilization of frustrated individuals and condemned by those on the left 
for its seemingly misplaced attacks on the Obama administration, has received more 
recognition in the mainstream media over the last two years than any other politically 
active group. The Tea Party prides itself on advocating citizen freedoms, but believes that 
such freedoms are undermined and threatened by government. The missions of both the 
Tea Party Express and the Tea Party Patriots, two of the most prominent nationally active 
Tea Party organizations, reflect concerns about constitutional adherence, the size of 
government, and excessive limits to market liberalism.151  
 When the Tea Party first emerged into the mainstream in early 2009, many 
assumed that the cause was the historically high rate of unemployment. With an 
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increasing number of individuals being left without work, it seemed likely that these 
people might displace their frustrations on the government. Subsequent polling data 
suggests, however, that Tea Party members are likely not the individuals whose daily 
survival is threatened by current economic conditions. The majority of Tea Party 
members are less concerned about unemployment than they are about limiting the size of 
government through cutting taxes and decreasing spending. Moreover, Tea Party 
supporters tend to be wealthier and better educated than the general public.152  
 Once the unemployment theory was debunked, it became commonplace to lump 
the Tea Party in with the Republican Party. At first glance the Tea Party’s interests seem 
to be more or less aligned with those of the Republican Party; and Tea Party members, as 
well as the representatives they select (whether or not they have voted in recent 
elections), do tend to associate themselves more with the Republicans than with the 
Democrats. But dismissing the Tea Party as merely a part of the Grand Old Party might 
lead us to oversimplify a movement that is in many ways new, unique, and quite 
complex.  
 In analyzing the Tea Party one must distinguish between the rhetorical claims 
made by Tea Party members and the actual aims of the movement, as well as examine the 
extent to which Tea Party activities actually further the cause of their envisaged goals. 
For example, while Tea Party members often refer to their movement as a “revolution,” I 
will argue that the goals of the movement consist of the achievement of certain political 
ends which are not all that revolutionary; a “restoration” might be a more accurate and 
descriptive term. And while Tea Party websites suggest the existence of a clear political 
platform, Tea Party ideology is remarkably incoherent and contradictory. The Tea Party 
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name may be the best example of the movement’s hypocrisy, invoking revolutionary 
events whose actual motivations were entirely inconsistent with Tea Party ideology. Yet, 
as Lepore explains, the Tea Party’s duplicity is a major source of its strength and among 
the reasons why it deserves further exploration:  
Nothing trumps the Revolution. From the start, the Tea Party’s chief political 
asset was its name: the echo of the Revolution conferred upon a scattered, diffuse, 
and confused movement a degree of legitimacy and the appearance, almost, of 
coherence. Aside from the name and the costume, the Tea Party offered an 
analogy: rejecting the bailout is like dumping tea; health care reform is like the 
Tea Act; our struggle is like theirs.153  
 
 The Tea Party’s ideological inconsistency and hypocrisy can be considered part of 
a broader method of acquiring political power through deceiving citizens, namely by 
using perceptions, in place of facts, as the basis for action. By rousing citizens’ already 
existent fears of diminishing civil liberties, the Tea Party has been able to propagate a 
purportedly freedom-enabling agenda that in fact defies conditions of substantive 
freedom in all of the ways that I have described in the previous three chapters. Through 
invoking an antihistorical version of the past, promoting an individualist conception of 
freedom, and provoking anxieties and fears of foreignness induced by globalization in 
order to advance theories of ethnocentrism, the Tea Party has replicated the traditional 
freedom-governance antagonism and, in doing so, has dangerously appropriated the 
language of freedom and democracy as a means of fortifying and reinforcing political and 
social hierarchies of rule. 
Fortifying Rule 
 In Chapter One I argued that activists, politicians, and judges have capitalized 
upon the legitimating force of the American Revolution and the subsequent founding of 
the nation, insincerely glorifying the country’s founding moments in order to forward a 
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political agenda that undermines substantive freedom. Beginning with its name, the Tea 
Party has exemplified such insincere glorification, invoking past events for political 
purposes despite these events’ factual inconsistency with Tea Party aims. Jill Lepore 
considers the Tea Party to be an “antihistorical” phenomenon, relying on an ideology of 
historical fundamentalism that considers “the academic study of history (whose standards 
of evidence and methods of analysis are based on skepticism) [to be] a conspiracy and, 
furthermore, blasphemy.”154 Because the political practice of antihistory categorically 
disregards facts, Tea Party members have been able to harness the force of the American 
Revolution and exploit its political strength while abandoning the substance of 
revolutionary principles and neglecting any obligation to adhere to them.  
 The Tea Party’s appropriation of the revolution and misrepresentation of its aims 
can best be seen in the movement’s claims that revolutionaries shared their contempt for, 
and fear of, an intrusive and excessively large government. Lepore relates the story of 
Massachusetts state senator Robert Hedlund who delivered a speech on April 15, 2009 
(tax day) in which he told supporters that the American Revolution ‘“was about a 
collection of interested citizens afraid of seeing their economic success determined by the 
whim of an interventionist governmental body.”’155These claims, combined with 
complaints about “taxation without representation,” served as a driving force behind the 
Tea Party’s antipathy toward government. By suggesting that the Tea Party was 
continuing the revolutionaries’ fight against big government, Tea Party leaders 
manufactured a legacy of distrust and suspicion of elected officials that served to validate 
much of the inflammatory rhetoric directed toward a president who had received 53% of 
the popular vote in 2008. 
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 Yet the Tea Party’s use of antihistory constitutes more than merely hypocrisy, 
inconsistency, or even fiction. The practice of antihistory not only encourages individuals 
to question the evidentially and factually driven sphere of history, but also to engage 
certain traditions, legacies, and actual events and repeat them in a contemporary setting. 
As Lepore explains, “the statement at the core of the far right’s version of American 
history…was more literal than an analogy. It wasn’t ‘our struggle is like theirs.’ It was 
‘we are there’ or ‘they are here’…Antihistory has no patience for ambiguity, self-doubt, 
and introspection.”156 Tea Party members do not merely invoke the revolution for 
political means but remarkably appear to believe at times that they are actually living the 
revolution. Tea Party members share “a set of assumptions about the relationship 
between the past and the present that…defies chronology, the logic of time.”157 Indeed, 
while the Tea Party has manufactured a false sense of the American Revolution in order 
to forward its political agenda, at least as damaging has been its invocation of a real past 
and its seeming desire to return there. 
 In a May 2009 speech, Fox News pundit Sean Hannity proclaimed, “It took more 
than two hundred years, but it now looks like we are headed back to where we started.”158 
Much of Hannity’s vision for “where we started” is fabricated and inconsistent with the 
reality of the 1770s; however, there are aspects of his vision that derive from a very real 
history of opposition to federal government. The words of Hannity and Hedlund, which 
helped to mobilize the Tea Party in its embryonic stages, revert back to a vision for 
America based upon states’ rights. Their claims echo those made by states’ rights 
advocates for nearly a century following American Independence, which culminated in 
the confederacy’s assertion of independence and the initiation of the Civil War.  
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 Tea Partiers’ aggression toward federal government has served to endorse 
assertions of state autonomy. From condemning Barack Obama’s speech to the nation’s 
schoolchildren as “indoctrination” to spawning the lawsuit led by over twenty state 
attorney generals in response to the passage of health care reform—termed “Obamacare” 
and “socialist medicine” at Tea Party rallies—the Tea Party has prompted a return to the 
states’ rights debates of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that hinged on issues of 
race and constitutionalism. Tea Partiers have aimed to associate themselves with the 
American Revolution, but their antipathy toward government evokes a much darker 
chapter in American history in which white confederates assailed the federal government 
in order to retain slave-holding rights. Tea Party members consistently deflect the “race 
question,” but accepting this sweeping denial of racial motivations would be assuming far 
too many coincidences. The Tea Party emerged following the election of the first black 
president in American history and much of the momentum behind the Tea Party stemmed 
from the development of the “birther” movement, a contingency that claims Barack 
Obama was not born in the United States.  
 Tea Party leaders have consistently sought to distinguish themselves from racist 
movements on the far right, but they have simultaneously projected a message which 
labels Barack Obama as foreign and dangerous. Their fears that Obama will undermine 
American political traditions by importing socialist values from elsewhere exemplify the 
forms of ethnocentrism that I discussed in the third chapter. Despite Tea Party attempts to 
shed the racist label, Tea Party rallies still tend to be almost exclusively white person 
affairs.  
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 A National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) report 
on the Tea Party published in October echoed the widespread concerns of endemic 
racism within the movement. According to the report, “The Tea Party movement has 
unleashed a still inchoate political movement who are in their numerical majority, angry 
middle-class white people who believe their country, their nation, has been taken from 
them,”159Addressing specifically the issue of President Obama’s birth, the New York 
Times, in its reading of the report, stated that the leaders of five of the six major 
nationwide networks within the movement, as identified by the NAACP, “have raised 
questions about the validity of President Obama’s birth certificate.”160 It bears noting that 
the report did not imply that all Tea Partiers are racist; however, it expressed concern at 
the movement’s seeming unwillingness to recognize and condemn the substantial 
contingent within their ranks who have espoused values of white supremacy and racial 
intolerance.  
 The NAACP report recognizes the relative diversity of opinions represented by 
the Tea Party and its authors are careful not to generalize; however, I believe some 
generalizations can and should be reached. A brief a look into the background of those 
individuals who are funding Tea Party activities, for example, exposes much about the 
actual goals that the movement’s activities aim to achieve. In an op-ed written by New 
York Times opinion writer Frank Rich in August 2010, Rich argued that the “billionaires 
bankrolling the Tea Party” should make us question the legitimacy and substance of Tea 
Party grievances. As Rich explained, “There’s just one element missing from these 
snapshots of America’s ostensibly spontaneous and leaderless populist uprising: the sugar 
daddies who are bankrolling it, and have been doing so since well before the ‘death 
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panel’ warm-up acts of last summer.”161 Rich’s article reveals the propensity for a 
conflict of interest between the political aims of a citizen movement supposedly intended 
to reclaim individual agency for average citizens and the economic interests of an ultra-
wealthy cohort of America’s financial elite.  
 Rich’s article was published during a week in which Jane Meyer wrote a related 
and influential article in the New Yorker, entitled “Covert Operations: The billionaire 
brothers who are waging a war against Obama.” Meyer’s article exposed the Koch 
Brothers as the financial impetus behind the Tea Party movement. The Koch brothers, 
she asserts, “are longtime libertarians who believe in drastically lower personal and 
corporate taxes, minimal social services for the needy, and much less oversight of 
industry—especially environmental regulation.”162 It goes without saying that the 
interests of the Koch brothers are divergent from and in many ways contradict those of 
middle-class Americans.  
 The Koch brothers, though public about their lifetime philanthropic endeavors, 
have sought to be far more discreet about their political activities. In 2004 David Koch 
started the Americans for Prosperity Foundation, which, after a relatively humble start, 
has since become a major backer and mobilizing agent of the Tea Party movement. In 
July 2010 the Americans for Prosperity Foundation sponsored a summit in Austin, Texas 
called “Texas Defending the American Dream.” According to Meyer, “five hundred 
people attended the summit,” yet Koch “did not attend the summit, and his name was not 
in evidence.”163 As Meyer further explains, the summit, which was meant to serve “as a 
training session for Tea Party activists in Texas,” was advertised as “a populist uprising 
against vested corporate power.” An advertisement said, “‘today, the voices of average 
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Americans are being drowned out by lobbyists and special interests, but you can do 
something about it.’” As Meyer points out, “the pitch made no mention of its corporate 
funders.”164 
 Rich and Meyer, in exposing the self-interested beneficiaries of the Tea Party, 
reveal the glaring inconsistencies between Tea Party rhetoric and the ideological driving 
force behind the movement. The Tea Party claims to be a vehicle for citizen mobilization 
and increased political agency; however, these citizens are being mobilized in order to 
serve the interests of politically and economically powerful individuals who hope to 
fortify existing societal hierarchies that actually function to the detriment of average 
citizens. On the surface the Tea Party may seem like a movement to empower citizens, 
but by relying on the freedom-governance dichotomy it serves to undermine freedom 
while fortifying rule and its inherent hierarchical structures. 
 Returning briefly to my discussion of Jason Frank’s book Constituent Moments in 
Chapter One, Frank defines constituent moments as times “when the 
underauthorized…seize the mantle of authorization, changing the inherited rules of 
authorization in the process.”165 In writing his book, Frank is concerned with the extent to 
which the people actually rule, whether or not they have authority or are merely the 
grounding of public authority for their representatives, and whether or not political power 
is seated in the people.166 In conceiving of the people as “at once a constituent and a 
constituted power,”167 Frank suggests that constituent moments may well consist of those 
instances in which individuals act as a “source of resistance to public authority.”168  
 Tea Party members might argue that their so-called revolution could be 
considered worthy of a “constituent moment,” for a central Tea Party claim is that its 
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constituency is underrepresented. Yet my analysis has suggested that the Tea Party’s not-
so-revolutionary movement actually undermines citizen attempts to overcome entrenched 
political and social structures. The short-term effect of Tea Party activities may include 
the mobilization of citizens and increased political engagement; however, in the long 
term, the Tea Party’s envisioned ends consist of returning to a certain form of status quo 
in which “the people” are likely even less powerful than they were before. The Tea 
Party’s supposed reclamation of freedom, based on the fundamental assertion that the 
government impinges upon freedom, actually reproduces hierarchies of rule.   
∗ ∗ ∗  
 Through my analysis in this chapter I have aimed to reveal that the traditional 
assumption that freedom defies an established order is illusive and misleading. I have 
asserted that promises of stability respond to natural tendencies and anxieties but rely 
upon a proclaimed ability to predict and foresee that no regime possesses. Through 
promising stability, hierarchical regimes are able to promote the assumption that freedom 
is destabilizing and dangerous, and thus to induce the voluntary forfeiture of citizen 
freedoms. Contrary to most of the theoretical literature on this topic, I have proposed that 
freedom can coexist with certain forms of stable governance, namely a system in which 
the people govern.  
 In order to demonstrate the power of the prevailing assumption that freedom and 
governance are opposed to one another, in the latter half of the chapter I initiated a 
discussion about the Tea Party movement, whose message and platform rely on this 
assumption. My discussion of the Tea Party showed how this oppositional framework can 
be employed deceitfully as a means of fortifying the hierarchical political structures. I 
argued in this section that the Tea Party has developed and disseminated theories of 
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antihistory, ideologies of ethnocentrism, and individualist conceptions of freedom in 
order reinforce a freedom-governance dichotomy that misrepresents freedom and 
reinforces rule.   
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V. Conclusion 
 In On Revolution, Arendt writes, “Thus it has become axiomatic even in political 
theory to understand by political freedom not a political phenomenon, but, on the 
contrary, the more or less free range of non-political activities which a given body politic 
will permit and guarantee to those who constitute it.”169 I have written this thesis against 
the political backdrop that Arendt describes, and in response to an increasing tendency to 
conceive of freedom as apolitical. I have written about a country in which political action 
and activism, and even a clear interest in politics, are looked down upon. America is a 
place where politicians are still enemy number one, even with middle-class families still 
reeling from the residual effects of a devastating financial disaster orchestrated by Wall 
Street’s millionaire elites. Freedom, it seems, has been so disassociated from the political 
sphere, that freedom and politics only metaphorically come into contact when it is alleged 
that a private and individualist form of freedom is under assault by politicians. It seems 
ironic that freedom is considered sacred in the U.S. and yet the content of political 
freedom is rarely, if ever, actually experienced.  
 Since the Revolutionary War, America has undergone an odd political evolution, 
defined largely by passivity and withdrawal. For centuries Americans have assumed that 
the U.S. is ahead of everyone else—more democratized, more liberalized. But this sense 
of political sophistication has only bred a justification for complacency and provided a 
reason to accept the status quo. The recent rise in grassroots political activity might have 
appeared to be a promising sign, but it has since become clear that these anti-government 
protests are the product of a corporate-funded distraction campaign. The rise of anti-
government sentiment during the Obama administration has not produced political 
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freedom’s reawakening, but has instead compounded our collective confusion about who 
we are and where we are headed. 
 So it might be asked why I have chosen to write about freedom, especially now. 
In conversations over the past nine months, I have been asked, on a broader level, why I 
chose to write a theory thesis: “Why not write about something tangible, something 
real?” The only response I can muster is that writing about a particular political issue 
would be unfulfilling. It would involve surrendering to the dominant discourse of the day 
by addressing a symptom of America’s political identity crisis but not the source of it. 
The fact that we already value so highly a misguided notion of freedom leads me to 
believe that it is still worth asking whether or not people might eventually be convinced 
that they should care also about their political freedoms. 
 As I wrap up this project I must admit that I am no more confident about the 
future of American democracy than I was before I began; however, optimism has never 
been the primary criterion by which a work of political theory should be judged. I do not 
suggest that this thesis is an antidote or even a partial solution; rather, this work should 
stand on its own as the reflections of a frustrated young democrat.  
 What I have written is timeless in its devotion to democracy, yet uniquely 
contemporary in its choice of targets for criticism. This thesis can be read in many ways. 
It is at times a story about challenges to freedom, both past and present, and the way 
these challenges are reinforced by mainstream political discourse and the state legal 
apparatus. At other times, it is a selective and highly limited history of turning points in 
American politics that provides a hypothesis about when and where America started 
moving away from democracy and toward rule by a powerful few. But above all, what I 
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have sought to provide is a different way of thinking, interpreting, and ultimately 
responding to political events. In my selection of theorists to consult, case studies to 
discuss, and theoretical frameworks to develop, I have tried to create a unique work that 
might encourage the reader to think about political life in a new way. While Arendt tells 
us that freedom is a condition experienced through action, I might add that the most 
important precondition for freedom is a way of thinking that makes freedom desirable, 
possible, and worth striving toward. 
 In some sense I hope that my completion of this work will provide a voice for the 
people whom America’s trajectory away from freedom has left behind. The America that 
I live in is a place defined by unfulfilled expectations and broken promises. It is a place 
that so badly needs widespread inclusion in public debate and political decision-making, 
but which is becoming less likely to reach these ends with each passing day. Real 
democracy is something of a fantasy at this point, a distant dream that is unlikely to ever 
be realized.  
 What I have tried to provide is a thorough critique of the ways in which freedom 
is conceived and repeated in political discourse. Through examining distinct time periods 
such as the founding and the age of globalization while contemplating enduring questions 
regarding the limits of free speech rights and the proper balance between freedom and 
organized governance, I have attempted to show how certain responses to contemporary 
problems derive from similar responses to past challenges. I suggest that the repetition of 
these responses has produced a general shift further away from substantive freedom and 
toward a more solidified and stratified political system of exclusivity and hierarchical 
rule.  
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 In addition to my critiques, I have provided a different way of conceptualizing 
freedom that wrests the responsibility of political decision-making away from the 
powerful few and returns it to the body politic. This conception of freedom derives 
primarily from the theoretical writings of Hannah Arendt. Like Arendt, I believe 
conditions of substantive freedom not only can coexist with democracy, but in fact 
reinforce and fortify democratic institutions. My devotion to democracy is based on the 
Arendtian notion of no-rule and the idea that true governance by the people might enable 
the weakening of those political institutions that solidify and aggravate existing 
inequalities. I believe that only through striving toward democratic “no-rule,” can we, in 
Arendt’s terms, “build a new house where freedom can dwell.” 
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